

[COMMITTEE PRINT]

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
(Revolt in the Satellites)

STAFF CONSULTATIONS WITH
JANÓS HORVÁTH
SANDOR KISS

COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
EIGHTY-FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

Index

JANOS
Sandor Kiss

MARCH 20, 1957
(INCLUDING INDEX)



Printed for the use of the Committee on Un-American Activities

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1957

89960

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

(Revolt in the Satellites)

STAFF CONSULTATIONS WITH

JANOS HORVATH

SANDOR KISS

COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FRANCIS E. WALTER, Pennsylvania, *Chairman*

MORGAN M. MOULDER, Missouri

CLYDE DOYLE, California

JAMES B. FRAZIER, Jr., Tennessee

EDWIN E. WILLIS, Louisiana

BERNARD W. KEARNEY, New York

DONALD L. JACKSON, California

GORDON H. SCHERER, Ohio

ROBERT J. MCINTYRE, New York

RICHARD ARENS, *Director*

II

MARCH 20, 1957

(INCLUDING INDEX)

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1957

CONTENTS

	Page
Synopsis.....	VII
March 20, 1957:	
Staff consultations with—	
Janos Horvath.....	3
Sandor Kiss.....	8
Index.....	I

III

PUBLIC LAW 601, 79TH CONGRESS

The legislation under which the House Committee on Un-American Activities operates is Public Law 601, 79th Congress (1946), chapter 753, 2d session, which provides:

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, ****

PART 2—RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

RULE X

SEC. 121. STANDING COMMITTEES

* * * * *

17. Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members.

RULE XI

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES

* * * * *

(q) (1) Committee on Un-American Activities.
(A) Un-American activities.
(2) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (i) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (ii) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (iii) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.

The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investigation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable.

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and to take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person designated by any such chairman or member.

* * * * *

RULE XII

LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT BY STANDING COMMITTEES

SEC. 136. To assist the Congress in appraising the administration of the laws and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, each standing committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the Congress by the agencies in the executive branch of the Government.

RULES ADOPTED BY THE 85TH CONGRESS

House Resolution 5, January 3, 1957

RULE X

STANDING COMMITTEES

1. There shall be elected by the House, at the commencement of each Congress:

(g) Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members.

RULE XI

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES

17. Committee on Un-American Activities.

(a) Un-American activities.

(b) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time, investigations, of (1) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.

The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investigation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable.

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and to take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpoenas may be issued under the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person designated by any such chairman or member.

26. To assist the House in appraising the administration of the laws and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, each standing committee of the House shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the House by the agencies in the executive branch of the Government.

SYNOPSIS

Two leaders of the Hungarian revolution who are now in the United States testified before the staff of the Committee on Un-American Activities on March 20, 1957.

The witnesses, Sander Kiss and Janos Horvath, fled from Hungary to escape arrest after Red army reinforcements crushed the uprising last November. Mr. Kiss is secretary general, and Mr. Horvath a member, of the Executive Committee of the newly formed Hungarian Revolutionary Council, comprised mainly of Hungarian freedom fighters.

Mr. Kiss and Mr. Horvath, both officials of the last free Hungarian Government, declared that Hungary today is in the grip of a "reign of terror imposed by the Red Army and reconstituted Hungarian security troops."

The present situation in Hungary is one of terror, of people being taken to prison and torture chambers and being executed virtually without a hearing—

Mr. Horvath declared.

In addition, he said, the number of unemployed has risen to around 350,000 and many of these are actually starving. Mr. Horvath estimated "conservatively" that between forty and fifty thousand Hungarians had been deported to the Soviet Union after the suppression of the revolution.

Mr. Kiss estimated that between fifteen and twenty thousand people were killed in the uprising, in contrast to the official report of only 1,800 deaths.

Most of these—

Mr. Kiss added—

were people who gave themselves up with the understanding that they might be pardoned and then were ruthlessly murdered by the Hungarian Government and the Soviets.

"In the town of Miskolc in the northwestern part of Hungary," he said, "56 people were summarily executed for participation in the revolution. In nearby Eger, 23 were executed." The toll in some other towns, he said, included 17 in Salgotarjan; 19 in Pesterzsebet; 20 in the Bakony Forest, one of the resistance centers; and 11 in the mining district of Komlo. Similar executions were carried out in almost every town and village throughout the country by the Red Army, he declared.

Most of the casualties of the fighting, Mr. Horvath declared, were "peaceful bystanders." Between five and six hundred people, he said, were killed in a period of a half hour as they watched a battle before the Parliament building in Budapest. Among them were a number of children.

"Actually," Mr. Kiss stated, "it is an error to consider the uprising and subsequent Soviet intervention an internal affair. In reality it was 'a Soviet-Hungarian war'." He continued:

On the 23d of October in a matter of 3 hours Hungary won its freedom. Ninety-nine percent of the people agreed that communism and Soviet domination must

be ended * * *. The heroism of the youth worked a modern miracle. The Hungarian people took up the fight and in 5 days from October 24 to 29 they conquered the Soviet Army that was arrayed against them.

Mr. Kiss and Mr. Horvath stated that the Soviets were originally prepared to recognize the regime established by Imre Nagy and decided to invade Hungary only when the "vacillation and inactivity of the U. N." indicated that they could do so without risking reprisal from the rest of the world.

If the U. N. had succeeded in sending an observer team into Hungary and had championed the cause of the Hungarians, this would have been of great benefit because it would have meant that the U. N. and the Western World recognized Hungary's right to self-government, freedom and independence—

Mr. Kiss declared—

The Hungarians today feel that the free countries of the world betrayed them, Mr. Horvath declared. "This is the feeling of the Hungarian people. That I want to emphasize."

Mr. Kiss asserted that it would have been "an extremely valuable step" if the United States and Western governments had severed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and satellite nations upon the invasion of Hungary by the Red Army.

"It is ironic," Mr. Horvath continued—

that fear of the Soviet Union is much greater outside of Hungary than inside the country.

The Hungarian people themselves are not afraid of the Soviet Union but as you reach the border this feeling becomes progressively more intense. In other words, the fear of the Soviets seems much greater here in the West than it does in the countries behind the Iron Curtain.

The witnesses reported that despite the repressive measures imposed upon the Hungarians by the Soviets and puppet Kadar regime, the people of Hungary have not lost their hope.

Mr. Kiss concluded—

The quest for freedom and liberty has become a religion in Hungary. The people say that it is better to die than to live under such conditions. They are ready to do so.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

(Revolt in the Satellites)

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 20, 1957

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D. C.

STAFF CONSULTATIONS

The following consultations, by the staff of the Committee on Un-American Activities, were held at 10 a. m., Wednesday, March 20, 1957, in room 226, Old House Office Building.

Staff members present: Richard Arens, director; K. Baarslag and William F. Heimlich, consultants, and Richard S. Weil, staff member.

Also present: Mrs. Elizabeth Vasvary, secretary to Ferenc Nagy and George R. Tucker, Jr., consultant to witnesses and former press secretary to Ferenc Nagy.

Mr. ARENS. Let the session come to order, please.

We are happy today to have the privilege of this staff interview with Sandor Kiss and Janos Horvath, who have only recently arrived in our country from Hungary and who were active participants with the revolutionary forces in that land.

I understand that each of you gentlemen has a prepared statement which you would like to read and elaborate upon at this time. Before having you do so, I should like to have each of you give us just a brief summary sketch of your own personal background.

May we begin, Mr. Horvath, with you because I understand you are a little more facile in the use of the English language.

Mr. HORVATH. My English is poor enough, but perhaps I can.

Mr. ARENS. Would you kindly, Mr. Horvath, tell us just a word about your own personal background and your own personal life?

Mr. HORVATH. If you would want me to tell that with my own words, I can; but it is in this memorandum that I gave some weeks ago to the U. N. committee.

Mr. ARENS. You have then, a memorandum sketch of your personal life; is that right?

Mr. HORVATH. Yes.

Mr. ARENS. It will be incorporated in this record at this point.

Name: Horvath, Janos.

Born: November 7, 1921, in Cece, Hungary.

Address in Hungary: Apaly-utca 2/b Budapest XIII, Hungary.

Vocational or professional position: Economist. After my release from Communist prisons I worked as a factory worker.

Membership in any political party or union: Member of the Great convention, of the Economic Committee, Financial Committee, and head of

the cooperative department of the Smallholders Party. Chairman of the Budapest, XIII. District (Angyalfold) Smallholders Party Organization. Member of the Hungarian Peasant Association since 1941, and since March 1945, economic director thereof. Elected member of Parliament on November 4, 1945.

During World War II, I was a member of the anti-Nazi and anti-German resistance movement. One of the leaders of the university students resistance organization, arrested in 1944 and sentenced to death after brutal tortures and treatment.

Arrested again in 1947 by the Communist Secret Police (AVO) on trumped-up charges while still a member of the National Assembly. Released after 4 years of forced labor.

In 1956, one of the leaders of those movements which revealed the moral, economic, and political bankruptcy of Communist dictatorship. One of the leaders of the events leading up to the revolution and later thereof, too, and as such took active part in discussions for the democratic development of the country.

After the November 4, second Soviet attack, the ammunition stored in three military barracks in Angyalfold was distributed to the freedom fighters on my orders and under my supervision. After November 5, I organized a stronghold in a large factory in Buda, where I had worked prior to the revolution and where I was elected into the Workers' Council. Later I took part in the fighting against the Red Army by organizing resistance groups and became liaison officer of the Freedom Fighters of the neighboring factories, of the Schmith Castle, of the Harmashatarhegy and Csucshegy.

When the revolution of the betrayed Hungarian people was crushed by the overwhelming Soviet forces, I left the country to work for its liberation. I represent now the Smallholders Party, the Hungarian Peasant Association, the Workers' Council, the Freedom Fighters organizations within the Revolutionary Council of Hungary.

Mr. JÁNOS HORVÁTH.

Mr. ARENS. Now, Mr. Kiss, in view of the fact that you have not yet acquainted yourself with the English language, may I ask if you, via Mr. Horvath, would give us a word about your personal background.

Mr. KISS. Yes.

Mr. ARENS. I see that you have a brief summary sketch of your background and personal history, which we will incorporate in the record at this point.

CURRICULUM VITAE OF SANDOR KISS

I was born on March 19, 1918, at Vasarosnameny, Hungary.

From 1943 I lived in Budapest.

I am a professor of philosophy and pedagogy.

In 1937 I joined the so-called March Front movement, which, under the leadership of Hungarian writers, aimed at the carrying out of a land reform and democratic reorganization of the Hungarian society.

In 1943 I joined the anti-Fascist resistance movement, and became the leader of one of the youth groups. I fought with Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, who was executed by the Fascists. In December 1944 I was arrested by the Gestapo and after 3 weeks of torture I was sentenced to death.

In 1945 I was elected president of the National Youth Organization, MADISZ. Seeing the aggressive methods of the Communists I resigned from this position and became the national director of the Hungarian Peasant Alliance, an organization representing the social and economic interests of the entire Hungarian peasantry. At the same time I was a member of the Hungarian Parliament as well as of the leadership and political committee of the Smallholders Party.

In 1947 I was arrested, charged with conspiracy, and sentenced to 3 years in prison. After my release from prison I earned a living by strenuous physical work.

In 1956 I joined the revolution at its very beginning, was active in the Petofi Circle as well as in the Revolutionary Committee of the Intellectuals and fought with arms. I took part in the general political negotiations as well as in the

negotiations aiming at forming a government. At the same time I was an organizer of the Smallholders Party and leader of the Peasant Alliance. I know the political history of the revolution as an eyewitness and participant in the events. After the second Soviet aggression I fought again with arms until my escape from the country.

At the Strasbourg congress of the Hungarian Revolutionary Council I was elected its secretary general.

Mr. ARENS. Would you kindly proceed at your own pace to read the statement you have prepared for submission to us today?

STATEMENT OF JÁNOS HORVÁTH

Mr. HORVATH. I came from a workers' district of Budapest. After my release from the Communist prison, I worked also as a factory worker for years. When I express my gratitude to this committee for the honor which was bestowed upon me to give my testimony personally, I assure the committee that I will try to give an account of the moving events of the Hungarian revolution as objectively as possible. I am sure that all the reports, the news items, and facts that were sent to the free world from Hungary are now at the disposal of this distinguished committee. I will follow up the series of events as an eyewitness and as a politician.

It is evident that the revolution of October 23, 1956, started with the support of the Hungarian workers, who lined up in close ranks behind the demands drawn up by the youth organization and the intellectuals.

For years the Hungarian workers were greatly passive. This does not mean that they did not follow with great interest the battle of the intelligentsia that shook the country during the last year. I do not seek to deny that there were Communists in 1945 in great percentage among them. They really supported the mass-manifestations organized by the Communist Party. It is undeniably true that the Communist Party received 17 percent of all the votes cast in the elections of November 4, 1945, which were held for the National Assembly. They also believed in their slogans and their program. These facts should also be taken into account in order to understand the complete disillusionment of the workers.

How could this happen? How did the Communist Government manage to turn against them 99 percent of the population of Hungary?

1. The Communists spoke of "democracy" and organized a one-party dictatorship with their 17 percent share in the National Assembly.

2. The Communists used the word "liberty" for a greeting and set up a police state and a country that looked rather like a big concentration camp.

3. The Communists branded as "enemies of the people" the leaders of the nation elected through free elections and imprisoned them or forced them into exile.

4. The Communists used the slogan "The factory is ours. We work for ourselves." And the director of the state-owned factory put into his office by the party had unlimited powers over his exploited and overtired workers.

5. The Communists propagated the "free cooperatives" to the peasantry. In reality they used every kind of pressure to force them into collective farms which were the property of the state.

6. The Communists spoke of the "freedom of religion"—and they imprisoned the church leaders or forced them into exile. I met in prison Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish church leaders.

7. The Communists spoke about the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and the "workers' state"—and they denied the right of free organization of trade unions, and the activity of the official trade unions was completely paralyzed.

8. The Communists took the word "socialism" into the constitution, and they denied the workers a chance to change their places of work.

And I have to finish—for I could continue to list their lies as Communist propaganda for pages.

What was the reaction of the workers?

For the workers in Hungary, it was impossible to talk about their grievances after 1948. Workers by the thousands disappeared in the secret police headquarters, those who knew and were not afraid to tell the truth. Then a long period of silence, followed by passive resistance. The workers did not attend the meetings organized by the party. And when the main entrance doors of the factories were closed, they sat there silently. After the speech there were no remarks. It was always a shameful scene, when the party secretary asked the workers to speak at least a few words.

Comrades, speak please.

Don't discuss the problems amongst yourselves in the corridors.

Comrades, it is impossible that you have no problems. We know that there are problems. Let us discuss them here and now.

But no voice was raised, because it was known that the answers were previously given in the "peoples' education" leaflets. Tension always hung in the atmosphere.

The regular reappraisal of the workers' norms caused much bitterness among the workers. The reappraisal of the norms resulted in 10, 20, or even 30 percent reduction of the wages. Reasoning: the development of the techniques and production processes. Reality: the worker had to produce 10, 20, or even 30 percent more on the same old machine he had used before, with the same production process, if he wanted to earn as much as the previous week. For example, I worked in the X-ray instrument and medical apparatus factory in Budapest, where I made, among other items, series switches for which I was paid, in 1951, 24 Hungarian forints. In 1955 for the same piece, I received only 9 forints.

Untold bitterness and hate filled the workers at such occasions. In order to show them the contradiction of communism, I quoted Stalin with some malice in my voice: "Work is honor and glory for us."

Rakosi once said: "Comrades we eat up our future." and "We can't eat the hen that lays golden eggs for us tomorrow."

Such a small sentence told by me at the appropriate moment, had greater effect than a half hour of eloquent speech about the inhuman Communist exploitation of the worker.

Meanwhile the tension grew year by year.

This is the reason why on October 23, 1956, in a few hours during the afternoon and evening, there was complete unity in the Hungarian nation without special organization of any kind. And when the students were fired upon before the building of the radio station, the whole nation rose up in arms. Those who had arms were fighting actively. And the decision was unanimous also: "Work will not be resumed until the Russians leave the country."

There would have been no bloodshed in Hungary without Russian intervention. Their intervention was a challenge to the nation. The sudden appearance of the Soviet tanks left no other alternative.

The factories became strongholds, the bases of further armed and political battle against the aggressor. Exactly as the Communists turned the people against them, the Russian aggression resulted in the same hate.

After this short review of backgrounds, I would like to turn to the details of events of which I was a personal witness.

1. On October 24, 1956, at about 9 a. m., three Soviet tanks drove through Marx Square, from the direction of the Western Railway Station into St. Stephen's Boulevard. They opened fire without provocation on the passersby. Two persons died on the spot, while the exact number of injured remained unknown, because of the crowd.

2. On October 24, 1956, around 11 a. m., Soviet tanks moved in front of the Western Railway Station and the post-office building. Among the pedestrians, there was an unarmed soldier of about 20 years of age talking to a civilian. One of the gunners of the Soviet tank aimed a machinegun at him and shot him dead with a series of shots. The crowd disintegrated immediately. After a few minutes, a young boy tried to approach the wounded soldier to help him. He was shot at by another Russian soldier with a tommy gun. The wounded boy staggered away, and was picked up a few yards away afterward by the people in the street, who took him away. The street was empty again. I returned to the spot an hour later, and I saw the body of the dead Hungarian soldier still in the street.

3. On October 25, 1956, at about 10 a. m., several Soviet tanks came from the Ministry of Defense in the Honved Street, and turned into St. Stephen's Boulevard. They made several maneuvers there and began to shoot wildly at times. They were not previously attacked, so it was evident that their shooting was done to intimidate the population of this district. As I happened to be in the building of the Research Institute nearby, I witnessed the action from one of the windows, but I was unable to ascertain the exact number of victims. I saw, however, several people fall to the ground.

4. On October 25, 1956, at about noon, a unit of 10 AVO men, escorting four freedom fighters, was crossing the Joseph Boulevard, going toward the southern side of Rákóczi Square. A crowd of several hundred persons witnessed the scene from a distance. As the crowd began to whistle and shout to the AVO men, they opened fire in all directions and this shooting lasted for several minutes. Several persons fell on the ground from the large crowd. A man of 50 died from a shot in the head.

5. On October 25, 1956, at about 1 p. m., I tried to go to the square before the Parliament Building, that was the scene of the mass murder of several hundred persons during the midday hours. Doctors and nurses in white went to aid the wounded showing some signs of life. They were unable to fulfill their duty, honored the world over where civilization exists. They had to withdraw because of the deadly fire opened from the top of the Ministry of Agriculture by the AVO.

Similar events were witnessed by the 1½ million inhabitants of Budapest. These events forged into complete unity the Hungarian nation. On October 24, 1956, the broadcasting station of the Gerő

clique abused the people from behind the ring of Soviet tanks. They branded the inhabitants of Budapest as a counterrevolutionary mob, gang of robbers, because they did not consent to Soviet aggression.

This was the greatest insult they could use against an innocent people, against the dignity of the nation.

Walking in the street, I happened to meet a person I did not know before. He looked like a worker. And as we went by an open shop window he said with a smile: "We plundered this, too, we the counterrevolutionary mob."

I do not know how he arrived at this conclusion. It may be that this lesson was taught him by history. He realized that a revolution is a popular uprising where oppressed and subjugated people shake off the chains of its masters, while in a counterrevolution the dictatorship of the tyrant is restored by terrorizing oppressed people. This proves that what is now happening in Hungary is nothing else than a counterrevolution: The Kadar clique restored the terror with executions, imprisonments, deportations, by acting from behind a Soviet tank column. Every tyrant in the course of history has acted in the same manner.

Gerő, the first Secretary of the Party, Hegedus, the former Prime Minister, and all the other Moscow-trained Communists knew long ago how the workers hated and despised them. Even though they did not visit the factories for years, even though they did not meet the workers, they realized it from the reports they were receiving. But they were convinced that by terror and drilled discipline their power will last forever. They saw the example of the Russian people. They were convinced that the rattling of Russian tanks, the explosion of gun shells and a few machineguns would insure their positions. As they had no conception of the people's wants or no connection with the people, they underestimated their yearning for freedom.

Their terroristic methods resulted in the complete unity of the nation.

The workers returned to their factories to elect the Workers' Councils. The former leaders were still there: the party secretary, the director, the chairman of the factory committee. They remained safe. If one of them was considered as their ally, he was even elected into the Workers' Council. However, one who was an enemy of the workers was asked to leave the plant. The limits were not drawn up on the basis of party membership. It was the standing in the war between the Soviet Union and Hungary of the certain person that was decisive.

In electing the Workers' Councils within the factories in Hungary, democracy was restored within the plants. The newly elected Workers' Councils drafted and listed the workers' demands. They drew up a long list of demands in the field of wages, social security, and the trade unions. But the sentence returned in every declaration: "Work will not be resumed until the Russians leave the country—until the date of free elections is fixed by the government."

These Workers' Councils sent their representatives to the government. It was these workers that Imre Nagy met during the revolution.

The usual Soviet tactics failed. They wanted to gain time by negotiations, but they were unable to realize their aims.

It became evident to the Soviet military leadership—at least by October 25—that with their occupation forces stationed in Hungary

they will be unable to reach their aims. The Russian soldier sitting in the tank, receiving his orders by wireless, could be used against the people. He was fighting—probably even against his own conviction—on the assumption that in fighting only two alternatives remain: to kill others or to be killed by them. In considering the attitude of the Russians in Hungary, one has to take into account that they had some knowledge about the life of the Hungarian people even though they were isolated from the inhabitants of the country they were occupying. And they knew something about the Hungarian people, despite the teaching of the political officers. When the Russian soldiers left their tanks, they began to talk to the people. And the people reproached them:

"Do you see what you have done?"

"Why did you do this?"

"What would you say if somebody else would do the same in Moscow?" and they showed them the destroyed homes and the dead.

I took part in one of these discussions on October 25, 1956, at the corner of Museum Boulevard and Rakoczi. Their reasoning was the following:

"We help the Hungarian workers against the factory owners and former landowners."

"We defend your factories."

"We fight against the counterrevolutionaries and plunderers."

"Tell us how it could be that there are so many barons and counts, bankers and capitalists here in your country? Why don't you liquidate them?"

These Russian soldiers began to realize that we were workers. We want more bread, more freedom and a more humane life. They have not been told the truth.

We came to an agreement with the personnel of those Russian tanks to move before the House of Parliament to tell the truth about the revolution to the Prime Minister, Imre Nagy. Hungarian flags, and the Kossuth crest were hoisted on the tanks. Men were jumping on them and former Hungarian soldiers sat in the tanks to aid the drivers. The whole crowd followed them. When they were on the Square, the secret police began the massacre which is known all over the world. Here more than 600 demonstrators were killed, among them many children.

Only after such bloodshed were the workers' delegations allowed to see Imre Nagy. The Soviet military leaders tried to gain time by allowing these discussions within the Parliament in order to send new troops into Hungary. Prime Minister Imre Nagy was informed by these delegations about the true nature of the revolution, that thousands of Hungarians are being murdered by the Russian forces and that there is no counterrevolution in Hungary, and that there was no looting in the country.

The picture given to the Prime Minister Imre Nagy by the Writers' Association, by the representatives of the Petöfi Circle, by the delegates of the university students, was completed by the reports of the workers' delegation of the county of Borsod, of the United Lamp Factory, Egyesült Izzó, the workers of Csepel and others.

There were Communists in great numbers among these delegates. And as he—Imre Nagy—realized the truth, he took the side of the revolution and identified himself with the Hungarian people.

In conclusion, I would like to speak of the role of the Hungarian peasantry in the revolution and in its preparatory phases. The policy of the "Big Lie" of the Communist Party showed its brutal face especially in the country. They realized that the peasantry will not support them, even temporarily. The fate of the Russian and Ukrainian peasantry, deprived of their lands, haunted the Hungarian peasants. It was especially for this reason that Rakosi and his followers in the beginning denounced the kolkhoz idea. Rakosi did everything to crush the Hungarian Peasant Association and imprisoned several hundred members for their opposition. This is not the proper place and time to go into detail of methods used in the forced collectivization of the land in Hungary, but I would like to suggest the idea of an investigation committee which should be set up in order to reveal the horrors of these crimes.

If plans would have been drawn up by the enemies of the Communist regime to destroy Hungarian agriculture, they would never have been so perfect in the results obtained. Because of the terror, the peasants fled from the land which was cultivated for centuries by their ancestors. Those who remained on the land became a slave of the state.

In the foregoing, I have tried to briefly outline the present state of affairs in Hungary.

Thank you.

Mr. ARENS. Thank you, Mr. Horvath, for that presentation.

Now, I understand that Mr. Kiss has a statement which he has prepared and which has been translated for our benefit; and, if you, Mr. Horvath, would kindly be good enough to read this statement on behalf of Mr. Kiss, we would be obliged to you.

STATEMENT OF SANDOR KISS (Read by János Horváth)

Mr. Kiss. 1. The causes of revolution: In 1944, at the end of World War II, the Allied Powers concluded an armistice agreement with Hungary in which there was guaranteed the democratic development in the country. The anti-Fascist parties started their activities. In 1945 the Hungarian people had free elections. Eighty-three percent of the votes were cast for the 3 non-Communist parties, 17 percent for the Communists.

Between 1945 and 1949, the Communist Party, with the help of the Russian occupational forces, liquidated the three non-Communist parties, the Smallholders, the Peasant Party, and the Social Democratic Party, and by using terroristic police methods established a Communist dictatorship.

The democratic political life ceased. A political terror regime was established, based on the secret police. Thousands were executed, hundreds of thousands imprisoned or sent to labor camps. In 99 slave-labor camps, about 120,000 people were forced to do slave labor, without any sentence or crime, for mere political reasons. The Communists did not spare their own supporters, either. The number of Communists executed in connection with a single case—that of Rajk—was 597. The names of these were published in a list shortly before the revolution. There was hardly any family in Hungary untouched in one or the other way by the savage political terror.

The people of Hungary have never been resigned to the loss of their freedom and independence. They have used every means they deemed reasonable for serving the purpose to fight communism. Under the heavy blows of the terror regime, resistance was passive and still countless lives were sacrificed.

Communism has completely lost its support from the Hungarian people. Although unable to quit the party, the workers with former Communist conviction turned against the party, disillusioned. Only opportunist and careerist elements remained active within the party with a handful of intellectuals who wanted to liberate the party from its subservience to the Soviet Party, and who, by demanding the democratization of the party and of its leadership in the years of 1953 to 1956, became the forerunners of a progressive, radical, national, and democratic revolution.

Shortly before the revolution, the following was the social situation within the country: On one side there was the overwhelming majority of the nation, about 98 percent, protesting with passive or open resistance against the regime, seizing every opportunity to regain its freedom.

On the other side, there was the party supported only by the active armies of the secret police and high-ranking party functionaries, the reliability of whom was obtained by a high standard of living even from Western point of view. Their salary with additional social benefits ranged from 10 to 15 times as much as that of a skilled worker.

This party leadership, which was subservient to the Soviet Communist Party, faced, from 1953 on, a small group of writers, artists, intellectuals who, although few in number, had a terrific influence in the country, and they were ranking behind Imre Nagy, whose heroic struggle was supported by the whole nation and especially by the youth of the country.

This was the reason why during the revolution 98 percent of the Hungarian people opposed in complete unity the dictatorship of the party and fought for a democratic regime based on multiparty system and for the establishment of a free, independent, and neutral Hungary.

2. Justification of the revolution: A revolution is justified if a people has no legal, constitutional means to reject the rule of its tyrants. According even to Marx in this case "the people may lose but its chains." So far the Hungarian revolution was probably the purest in world history because the oppressed and oppressors were never facing each other in such a ratio and in such a great disproportion. It is evident that in the Hungarian revolution those who belong to the old Stalinist-Rakosist group supported by the military strength of the Soviet Union, the AVO men represented in the past and represent even now the counterrevolution.

3. Participants in the revolution: It was first of all the youth of the nation that took part in the revolution. Those who started the revolution and who were the moving force in it were the young peoples, who were educated and indoctrinated by the Communist system for more than 10 years. In the schools and universities the Communist ideology was the most important subject. Other ideological tendencies were strictly forbidden. It is well known that the children were classified even in the elementary schools according to their social origin and their parents' reliability. Those belonging to the enemies of the worker's class, that is, children of the former ruling

classes, or those who were politically unreliable, were marked with the letter "X." A school boy or girl with the sign "X," though talented or outstanding, was unable to continue their studies in the high schools, except by accident, and were never able to enter the universities unless their parents were fellow travelers. Nevertheless, the students who were the children of workers and peasants fought in the revolution in complete unity and fearlessness.

Even the majority of the Zrinyi and Petöfi military academy was supporting the revolution. These boys were the sons of the AVO personnel, high-ranking state officials, leading economic figures, and high party functionaries. They enjoyed special treatment in these academies from their 10th year of age.

They were well provided for and were housed in luxury colleges. They were considered as the real supporters of the regime. This was the reason that they were sent in against the freedom fighters when the army and the regular police failed. But even this was in vain. They joined the freedom fighters around the Killian barracks, the Corvin passage, and the Ludovika military academy.

The young workers joined the demonstration on October 23 on the large square in front of the House of Parliament. The students used cars to distribute quickly the 18-point declaration to the large and medium-size factories in and around Budapest. The young workers joined immediately and there was no difference between students and workers.

Not even the political officers were able to force to fight the army and the regular police. Soldiers were taking part in large numbers in the demonstration before the House of Parliament even on October 23. Not only the common soldiers, but the pupils of the officers training schools, too. And to make possible that the great crowd gathered in this enormous square may hear the speeches, they brought three army cars equipped with loudspeakers.

On October 23, 1956, at 2200 hours a battalion of soldiers was sent for reinforcement to the building of the Budapest radio station. They were well armed and wore helmets. They were stopped by the large crowd at the crossing of the Rakoczi Street and Little Boulevard. An old worker jumped on the platform of a truck and began to recite the well-known poem of Mrs. Jenny Varnai: "Shoot not my son for I'll be also in the crowd." It was followed by the singing of the National Anthem and Appeal. At first the soldiers looked inquiringly to their officers, but when the crowds finished the appeal, they jumped down from their trucks and handed over their arms to or went with the freedom fighters. They informed the crowd, that they have no ammunition, for the arsenals are guarded by special AVO units and the soldiers were supplied with bullets only on order given by Russian political officers attached to every military formation.

It is a well-known fact how Pal Maleter joined the freedom fighters and who was an officer of the Red army during World War II. During the whole revolution and freedom fight, not a single Hungarian soldier used his arms and shot at the freedom fighters. The armored division of Piliscsaba was ordered to occupy the Margaret Bridge over the Danube on October 24, early in the morning. They occupied the two bridgeheads, closed the bridge from the traffic and they did not allow even the Russians to cross the bridge until an order was given to move away.

There was not even a single policeman who had shot at the revolutionaries or freedom fighters. If they were ordered to move out of the barracks, they joined the fighters or handed over their arms.

Only the armed secret police, the AVO, proved to be reliable for the regime. The basis of their reliability was the same as that of the high party functionaries. They had a monthly salary of 9-10-12,000 Hungarian forints. Paybills were found on captured secret policemen showing the amount of their salaries.

It was unique in the history that the Hungarian revolution had no leaders. It was not organized. It was not directed centrally. The will for freedom was the moving force of every action. At the beginning of the revolution the leading role was played by Communists almost exclusively. There was, however, no difference made among those fighting in the revolution as to their party affiliations or social origin. Members of the former ruling classes in Hungary either emigrated or vanished without traces. Those who still were in the country, which was a negligible small number, did not dare to participate in the fighting because of their fear of reprisals, not to speak of leadership. Everybody helped the fighters. If standing in line before stores for food, they were given free entry. "They are our sons" was the slogan. It was estimated that not even 10 percent of the population was indifferent toward them because of fearing reprisals. But even these persons joined the revolution in the hate of the AVO men, in the demand for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary and in the establishment of complete freedom in the country.

4. Who are responsible for the revolution and why? The revolution broke out on October 23, 1956.

The Hungarian Government and party delegation headed by First Party Secretary Erno Gerö returned from a state visit in Belgrade at 10 a. m.

At 1253 hours radio Kossuth broadcast the following:

Minister of the Interior, Laszlo Piro, rejected the request of the students for the holding of pro-Polish demonstrations and meeting at the statue of General Bem and before the Polish Embassy.

This interdiction was repeated at 1315 hours over Budapest radio.

However, at 1423 hours the procession and the demonstration was granted.

At 1930 hours the official organ of the Government, the radio, describes the events in the following manner:

National flags, young people with rosettes of the national colors singing the Kossuth song, the Marseillaise, and the Internationale—this is how we can describe in colors and in the titles of songs how Budapest today is bathed in the October sunshine and celebrates a new Ides of March.

* * * * *

This afternoon a vast youth demonstration took place in our capital. * * *

Although at noon today the Ministry of the Interior banned all demonstrations, the Politburo of the Hungarian Workers'—Communist—Party changed the decision.

Scholars, students of technological faculties, students of philosophy, law, economics, together with students from other university branches, took part in the march led by their professors and leaders of the university party organizations.

At first there were only thousands but they were joined by young workers, passersby, soldiers, old people, secondary school students and motorists. The vast crowd grew to tens of thousands. The streets resounded with these slogans: "People of Kossuth, march forward hand in hand," "We want a new leadership; we trust Imre Nagy," "Long live the People's Army," and so forth. The shouts reverberate, the national colors flutter in the air, windows are open. The streets of Budapest are filled with a new wind of greater freedom * * *

I have to emphasize the following essential sentence:

Although at noon today the Ministry of the Interior banned all demonstrations, the Politburo of the Hungarian Workers—Communist—Party changed the decision.

It is evident from the facts that the Politburo was in session between 10 and 1423 hours, and it was on this session that the demonstrations were permitted to take place. After not more than one and half an hour, at 4 p. m., the Soviet armies in Szekesfehevar and Kecskemet were alerted and sent against Budapest.

At 2000 hours Budapest radio broadcast the tape-recorded fatal speech of Party Secretary Gerö accusing the youth with chauvinism, fascism, and counterrevolution. He abused the inhabitants of Budapest, which was enthusiastically demonstrating in the large square in front of the Parliament Building for the fulfillment of its national and democratic demands, for the acceptance of the 16-point students' declaration.

At the same time, a special unit, consisting of the most fanatic, most reliable, AVO men, organized for such possibilities, was sent into the radio station.

I will relate the series of events of the following hours as an eyewitness, and this review will show clearly who is and was responsible for those events.

Until the use of arms by the AVO, the Hungarian people did not think of a bloody revolution and fight. But the speech delivered by Gerö added oil to the fire.

Let us go to the radio station building, and read our points—these were shouted by the crowd while men and women jumped on trucks standing nearby.

At the radio station building they were confronted by the AVO unit. The crowd following the trucks was marching in closed ranks, without arms. The policemen used, first, tear gas. The crowd pulled back; then moved forward again. The commanding police officer ordered "Fire," but the AVO men did not shoot. He then seized his revolver and shot at the nearest secret policeman. The others opened the fire. Screams, death rattles, and running back followed. After a few minutes they picked up the dead and wounded demonstrators. Eight persons died and seven were wounded who were brought into one of the main lecture rooms of the university's physical science faculty, to the so-called Golyavar—Stork-castle.

The indignation and bitterness of the people resulted in unbelievable measures. People began to burn AVO personnel cars and trucks parked on the streets. Several of them jumped on trucks with the words:

Let us go to Csepel and Ujpest for arms and ammunition. The AVO men killed our fellow countrymen. We should appeal to the workers of Csepel and Ujpest.

Soldiers told the people where to go for arms and ammunition. The first truckload of arms arrived there about 90 minutes later,

about a quarter to midnight, bringing the arms and ammunitions from the armament factory on the Soroksari Street.

After their distribution on the spot, the struggle began for the building of the radio station with the arms of the army ordered to the spot, but which were handed over to the people or were used by the soldiers themselves who went to the freedom fighters. At half past 2, in the early morning, they occupied the building.

At about 2 a. m., Soviet tanks were seen from the direction of Szekesfehevar coming to Budapest. The Calvin Square was full of demonstrators. At 3 a. m. armored cars were running on Rakoczi Street. The crowd is defenseless. It consists mainly of young men.

We should not be afraid. We have no arms. They can't hit us. The crowd does not move. The first armored car turns back in front of the demonstrators. After about 5 minutes it returned and fired a series. Fleeing, screaming, and death rattle follows. A streetcar conductor jumps into one of the streetcars and sets it into movement and then jumps down again. He is followed by a boy of about 14 who sets into movement another streetcar. The trams run into the Russian tanks. They have no time to leave the rails. One of them was completely destroyed, the other was derailed, blocking the road. The Russians began to shoot wildly in every direction. They shot at houses. The revolutionaries move out of the radio station building, return the fire from the garden of the National Museum, and so began the freedom fight in Hungary. A war started, which was the first in which the Soviet Union openly took part after the Second World War, and this happened to be against the Hungarian people.

The weakness of the regime is evident. There is no force in the country, with the exception of the AVO, on which the party could rely. Only one night was needed for the collapse of the Hungarian Army and Police force. They were partly joining the revolution and partly deserting. The freedom fighters managed to occupy the radio station. It was a matter of hours to clear out the AVO centers in the city, if the Russians would not have intervened.

At 4 a. m., the newly formed university revolutionary committee was in session in the central university building. One of the leading personalities called Mr. Hegedus, then Prime Minister, by phone.

Question on the phone:

For God's sake, why did you ask the Russian intervention? Do you know really what you have started?

Answer on the phone:

The comrades are very nervous. In an hour everything will be quiet.

The events are running. Fighting is going on around the radio station building and near Ullői Street.

At 8:13 a. m., Budapest radio announces the decree of the central committee about the formation of a new Politburo, and a proposition for the nomination of Imre Nagy as Prime Minister and Andras Hegedus as his first deputy to be forwarded to the Presidential Council. Finally, it repeats the sentence:

Attention, attention. We repeat the announcement. Imre Nagy was appointed Prime Minister and Andras Hegedus his first deputy.

At 8:45 a. m., announcement of martial law throughout the country, allegedly signed by Imre Nagy, as Prime Minister.

Shortly after, at 9 a. m., the announcement was read over the radio about the calling in of Soviet forces. Imre Nagy's name was not mentioned.

Mr. Imre Nagy addresses the nation for the first time at 1210 hours. He pleads with the freedom fighters to lay down their arms and envisages an amnesty. His voice is slow, and when he falters in his speech a low voice urges him: "On. On."

5. Who called in the Russians? Were the Russians intervening legally into the internal affairs of Hungary?

Mr. Imre Nagy spoke as Prime Minister only at 1210 hours through the radio to the nation on October 24, 1956. The Russian forces started to move against Budapest at 4 p. m. on October 23, 1956. They intervened at 3 a. m. the next day. It is evident that only Gerö or Hegedus called them in, without any decision taken by the Council of Ministers, for no document was published in connection with it.

Imre Nagy was brought back to Budapest only on the demand of the demonstrators before the Parliament Building, and was allowed to speak to the crowd. At 3 a. m. the Parliament Building and the party center nearby was surrounded by a strong Soviet ring of tanks defending the central committee and the Politburo. The Government was actually imprisoned, and they acted in its name.

On October 24, 1956, the people believed that Imre Nagy had also had a part in asking for armed Soviet intervention and had adverse feelings toward him. However, on October 31, 1956, Imre Nagy gave an interview to the Vienna and Berlin RIAS radio stations. The part of the interview referring to this is as follows:

Question. You said just a few minutes ago that you were put under pressure to bring in the Soviet troops, that it was not you who invited the Soviet troops to move into Budapest. Who invited them?

Answer. It was not I—that I can say. At that time I was not Premier. I was not a member of the central committee of the party.

Question. How then did the opinion appear that you invited the troops?

Answer. I do not know. At that time I was not a member of the leadership. It may have been this way: At first it was said it was the government, and then later on, after 2 or 3 days, I was made Premier, and the masses are unable to differentiate. Two days ago, or now, it is all the same to them.

Question. But did you not approve of the invitation to the Soviet troops afterward?

Answer. No.

Question. Did you say it was necessary for the reestablishment of peace and order, or did you not?

Answer. No, no, no. I did not say such thing, and I must say that its appearance has caused much damage.

The journals published during the revolution started from October 25, 1956, on to ask impatiently: Who is responsible for the Russian intervention?

The attack was specially directed against the Stalinists, but in the early days the question of Imre Nagy's responsibility was also raised. But all the delegations visiting Mr. Imre Nagy return with the news that he had no part in the decision to call in the Russians.

The journal Egyetemi Ifjusag (University Youth) writes, among others, the following about Imre Nagy in its October 29, 1956, edition:

On Tuesday *** the entire crowd of 100,000 gathered in front of Parliament demanded Imre Nagy. Not only this crowd *** but all the Hungarian people felt that Imre Nagy was a man who would represent the people's interests. Since then, this confidence has weakened day by day. Today the entire population is

by no means united behind Imre Nagy. People have been disappointed in him. This disappointment was caused by mistakes. Just as it was a mistake when Radio Free Europe broadcast the news that it was Imre Nagy who called in the Soviet troops. The Soviet troops were called in by Andras Hegedus on Tuesday night. He said so himself to the writers' delegation *** Imre Nagy was fooled and outwitted by the treacherous Gerö clique which gave orders in his name and behind his back *** He was not informed of the true state of the revolution. Then, when he learned the truth *** he was isolated and not allowed to act. On Wednesday morning at 0500 the Writers' Association phoned Imre Nagy to ask him what measures he intended to take. It was only then that Imre Nagy learned that he was Premier. Only then, when the entire city had already been informed. It was impossible for him to have called in Soviet troops because, as everyone knows, they had already arrived *** The radio kept announcing in his name orders of which he knew nothing *** We have been fooled. Just as we should have been fooled again had not the treacherous Gerö clique been liquidated ***

On October 31, 1956, Zoltan Zelk, the well-known poet, member of the presidium of the Writers' Association, twice Kossuth award winner, described in a broadcast a visit he and two other writers made to leading Government members on the night of October 24, 1956, to present their demands.

They demanded that the Government should hand over the power to those who enjoyed the affection of the people. Under no condition should the order have been given to fire on the people. "We were conducted into a small room," said Zelk, "where we continued waiting. Finally, we were admitted to Andras Hegedus. He lyingly said that a Fascist counterrevolution had broken out which may be subdued only by arms. If—continued Hegedus—they themselves are unable to handle this alone, they would call in Soviet troops. He said this smilingly, as someone who had already thought out a devilish plan." But they were not allowed to see Imre Nagy. He was then truly a prisoner.

The organ of the Revolutionary Army and Youth wrote the following in its publication of October 31:

The Soviet armies were already called in and martial law declared when Imre Nagy took over the premiership. By this he was put before fait accompli. Even on Friday, October 26, 1956, the Hegedus-Gerö clique tried to force him to sign an antedated document in which he should have had asked the Soviet armies to aid in crushing the Hungarian uprising. It is self-evident that Mr. Imre Nagy did not sign this letter. The same day the following leaflet was distributed on the streets of Budapest, by the Revolutionary Council of University Students, We Trust Imre Nagy.

We trusted him on October 23, 1956—

began the leaflet—

although this confidence was shaken for about 2 or 3 days. Now it is stronger than ever. It has become evident that Imre Nagy was a prisoner of the security police for 2 days, and that he made his first radio announcement with a machine-gun at his back. His recent declaration revealed that the introduction of martial law and the interference of Soviet troops were not ordered by him, and that the Rakosi-Gerö scoundrels charged him with this in order to cause his downfall.

It is evident from all these facts, that the Russians were called in not by Imre Nagy, or not even by the former government but by Gerö and Hegedus. Undoubtedly the Polish events had a considerable role in calling in the Russians, where the 16 Russian armies marched against Warsaw only when the Polish security police went over to the side of Gomulka and barred the main roads leading to the capital and defended them resolutely with up-to-date arms. In Hungary the peaceful democratization was not allowed. The demonstration was

permitted by the Gerö and Hegedus clique for they considered it as a good opportunity to liquidate the opposition within the party. They wanted to liquidate Imre Nagy, the writers, the Petöfi Circle, in order to reintroduce Stalinism in Hungary.

6. Were the Russians entitled to intervene in Hungary? The Warsaw Pact was given as the legal basis for intervention by the Soviet Government. But this pact signed in Warsaw gave no legal basis whatsoever for intervention. I refer here to the arguments presented by Gen. Bela Kiraly, who discussed this problem in detail.

The other cause given was the peace treaty with Hungary. Article 4 of the treaty declares that Hungary cannot allow the existence on its territory of nondemocratic, Fascist organization.

As I had the honor to explain here, there were not even demonstrations in Hungary, when the Soviet forces began to move against Budapest. The demonstrations themselves were described by Radio Kossuth as democratic in its broadcast given at 1930 hours, on October 23, 1956. During the whole revolution not even a single organization worked actively or took part in it which had Fascist characteristics or aims.

The Writers' Association and the Petöfi Circle had the leading role during the preparatory phases. Especially it was the Writers' Association which led it, after having elected a new leadership last summer.

This was the first free election in Hungary since 1947.

The Petöfi Circle was the club of the Communist intellectuals. The youth gathered into the associations sponsored by the regime. The army, the police would have been the supporters of the regime, not even mentioning the workers. If the Russians were to be called in because of the danger of fascism and counterrevolution, only the AVO and the army of well-paid party officials were good democrats in Hungary for only they were faithful to the Stalinist regime.

The political parties which were revived by the revolution were the democratic parties of the 1945 coalition. Their leaders were almost without exception the victims of the Hitlerite-Fascist persecutions, who were sentenced to death and who later on suffered several years of imprisonment in the Communist regime, too.

In this Hungarian revolution if there would have been individuals with counterrevolutionary convictions, they would never have been able to succeed for the revolution never left the democratic principles in its political aims, humanitarian attitude, and means.

7. Circumstances of the first Russian intervention: At 3 a. m. on October 24, 1956, a strong ring of Russian tanks surrounded the buildings of the House of Parliament and the party center in Budapest. From this moment on, the Government actually was but a prisoner of the Russians. Early in the afternoon, Mikoyan, First Deputy Prime Minister of the U. S. S. R., arrived by plane to the Ferihegy Airport, accompanied by high-ranking Soviet military officers. They gave orders in the name of the Hungarian Government.

While the armed fighting went on in the street against the Soviet armies, the fighting went on in the House of Parliament without arms, on a political level, for the political victory over the Russians between the revolution and the Russian emissaries.

As I pointed out previously, they gave orders in the name of Imre Nagy, although he was called in to take part in the conferences only in the morning.

Even the composition of the first Government demonstrates clearly that they wish to use him as a puppet because of his great personal popularity. Andras Hegedus, the closest servant of Rakosi, became his First Deputy, who was the Prime Minister of the Cabinet immediately before him. At the same time, Erno Gerö was reaffirmed in his post of First Secretary. This was an open challenge to the revolution. Erno Gerö was branded as a traitor and murderer together with the AVO by the people. They knew, however, that in a Communist Party dictatorship the real power rests in the hand of the party's First Secretary.

October 25, 1956, was the turning point in the revolution. The Russians considered themselves the masters of the situation. With the exception of a few resistance centers, the Russian tanks are in control of the streets. Orders were issued to resume work. They thought that the scenes of destroyed houses and the dead on the streets were ample deterrents to continue the rebellion. And now the unexpected happened.

The reaction is adverse. The people become resolute. Ten Russian tanks go over to the freedom fighters near the Astoria Hotel. The people began to talk with the Russian soldiers and to call to account them.

Why did you do this?

Answer. We have been told that you were attacked by Fascists. * * * But now we see that you fight for your freedom.

In a moment Hungarian flags appear, and the people overrun the tanks.

Let us go to the Parliament. Down with Gerö. The AVO is full of murderers. Independence—freedom—we are not Fascist.

They go with the tanks before the Parliament Building to demonstrate. Machinegun nests are located on the tops of the buildings of the Ministry of Agriculture and of the former Highest Court, now housing the Museum for Party Movement History. They may belong to the Russians or to the AVO. They wait until the crowd of about 15,000 is in the big square. Then they began the firing and mass murder. Until a single person is moving on the square, they shoot incessantly. About 600 to 800 dead remain on the square.

It became clear that the occupying Russian forces are not willing to fight, because they know where justice is. Political officers (politruk) are planted into each tank who direct and control them. Even now they are unwilling to fight; they hoist the Hungarian flag on their tanks. After this the Government began to receive the delegations in the Parliament. These delegations represent workers' councils, revolutionary councils, youth and freedom fighters. At the same time Erno Gerö is dismissed.

It became by then clear to Mikoyan that they cannot win the battle against such a resolute people with these Russian armies. They began to bargain with the workers' delegations through Imre Nagy. The radio station in Budapest is still abusing the people by speaking about plunderings and counterrevolution although all the shop windows are intact without glass being in them. Several have the inscription: "This is how the Magyar is plundering." The radio stations in the country, however, are in the hands of the freedom fighters and they broadcast their demands.

During the discussions, the University Revolutionary Youth tried to steal Imre Nagy out of this physical and psychical tank ring, of the Soviet captivity, in order to show him what the real situation was and there is not even the slightest sign of counterrevolution. But without succeeding in this, the aims of the revolution are realized step by step. There is no other solution in the actual situation than the revival of the 1945 coalition parties.

Mikoyan and his collaborators recognize their defeat; they decide on the withdrawal of Russian forces from Budapest and at the same time they publish the well-known Moscow declaration.

In this declaration the Soviet Union acknowledges the past faults committed against the satellite states and states that the great community of Socialist states and nations may be built on the principles of mutual relations based on the complete equality, taking into consideration the territorial integrity and sovereignty and independence on the nonintervention into each others' internal affairs.

This fact enables the Imre Nagy government to move freely and may start to solve the serious internal and external problems.

8. Was there really a counterrevolution? When the revolution broke out, there were Stalinist party officials who behaved like the AVO men, like Joseph Kalmar, the secretary of the Csepel Party Committee. He himself and the adults of his family began firing on the unarmed demonstrators from the party headquarters. The angry crowd sieged the building, penetrated into it, and lynched them.

In Magyarovar the AVO shot dead 83 persons. The people seized the two officers who gave the orders and beat them to death.

On October 30 and 31, 1956, the freedom fighters began to mop up the city from AVO men by seizing them. They had orders to escort them into the prisons of Marko Street, but they were beaten to death at several places by the enraged people.

In the period ranging from October 23 to 30, 1956, the great Budapest Party Headquarters on the Tisza Kalman Square became an AVO fortress from which they killed and murdered many freedom fighters; among others, wounded ambulance personnel and peaceful passersby. The party headquarters had acquired a dreadful fame in the region. On October 30, 1956, when the Russians had ordered cease fire to their troops, Joseph Dudas and his freedom fighters called on them to surrender. They answered with renewed firing. Thus the fighting began against them, but they did not succeed with small arms. Thus they asked for tank and gun reinforcement until finally a white flag appeared on the building. The angry fighters shot the AVO men because of their heavy losses caused in human life.

In the last year even the Communist press gave horrified reports of the role of the AVO when it published the story of the forced confessions in the show trials. After the victory of the revolution the horrors of the AVO prisons became universally known, the torture chambers, the underground inquisition cellars, and even crematories. We have personally witnessed the operation of this sadist torture organization. If a committee would be assigned to collect the facts among the refugees, its work may take even months until it could collect the facts and data of the most cruel tortures. However inexcusable the murders and lynchings were it should be stated that (1) the freedom fighters did not hurt anybody who did not take up arms against the revolution; (2) as the lynchings occurred on October

30 and 31, 1956, when the Russians were already withdrawn, the correspondents and reporters of the foreign press agencies were able to be present and had taken the pictures.

But who was present on October 25, 1956, on the Square of Parliament, when about 600 to 800 persons were killed on the spot and when even the ambulances were received with deadly machinegun fire? Or early on October 24, 1956, when the Soviet forces moved into Budapest and on the Vorosmarty Square where about 200 to 300 young secondary school girls and boys were encircled and shot until there was not one moving. The young girls tore into pieces their chemises and showed them as a sign of surrender, but there was no clemency.

Notwithstanding, the Hungarian National Revolutionary Council, together with the delegates of the freedom fighters and revolutionary councils in collaboration with the Government took every measure as early as October 30, 1956, to stop the legitimate revenge against the mass murderers. On October 30, 1956, the police and the freedom fighters drew up a detailed plan with Prime Minister Imre Nagy for the restoration of law and order and personal safety in Budapest. As a result the individual or group revenges stopped by October 31, 1956, and any captured AVO man was escorted to Marko Street prisons.

The delegation representing the puppet Kadar regime at the United Nations branded Joseph Dudas as a counterrevolutionary leader. The late Joseph Dudas was a passionate revolutionary and a few facts of his life may give a true picture about his character. He was about 45 and by profession a mechanical engineer. He was a member of the illegal Rumanian Communist Party. He spent 9 years in fortress prisons there. He came to Hungary in 1942. He then joined the illegal Communist Party. He was sent with the armistice delegation of the Hungarian independence front to Moscow in 1944 through the battlefields where he had discussions with Foreign Minister Molotov. In 1945 he left the Communist Party because of disagreement between himself and Rakosi and other Muscovite Communists. He saw the assurance for Hungary's social progress and national independence in this historic situation in the Independent Smallholders Party. He later became municipal councilor. The older Communists, the opponents of Rakosi kept relations with him. He was finally arrested in 1947. Released in 1948 but after 3 months he was arrested again and was held in forced labor camps for 7 years.

After his last release in 1954 he worked as an engineer in the gear factory of Budapest. During the revolution he established the Hungarian National Revolutionary Committee. He became the leader of one of the greatest armed freedom-fighter groups. He occupied the building of the Communist official journal Szabad Nep and organized there his headquarters and published the journal Magyar Fuggetlenség (Hungarian Independence). He was wounded in the second Soviet attack on November 4, 1956. He was hidden by the workers in the factories of Kobanya. Well-known and famous writers and workers went in delegation to the Government on his behalf. Seemingly, Kadar accepted the demand of the delegation and sent a message to Dudas saying that he wished to discuss with him the possibilities of a solution. Dudas fell into the trap, he went into the Parliament Building and Kadar issued orders for his immediate arrest. Finally, he put him to death.

The fact that Dudas was a revolutionary and not a counterrevolutionary may be seen in his scripts published in his journal Magyar Fuggetlenség.

9. Aims of the revolution: The principal aims of the revolution were contained in the 16-point declaration of the university students drawn up on October 22, 1956. These demands were amended and completed by the demands and point of the workers, peasantry, and the countryside in the days of the revolution. The revolution recreated or revived the coalition parties of 1945 which accepted all the demands of the revolution. There was not even a single point in the journals, leaflets, publications, and items in the radio program which was not democratic. The demands contained the following essential points:

1. Hungary's independence, the withdrawal of Soviet troops.
2. Cancellation of the Warsaw Pact, neutrality.
3. Coalition government on the 1945 basis.
4. Democratic state administration.
5. Democratic economic life.
6. Free elections under international supervision.

Each program emphasized that the basis of the future foreign policy of the country is the equality and independence, friendship with the Soviet Union, and with every country. They underline the neutrality based on the pattern of Switzerland and Austria which may be the best means of peace and security in the Danube Valley. They reject every kind of restoration and accept the social achievements. They take as unalterable the land reform and the nationalization of the key industries.

The delegation of the puppet Kadar regime lies that the Smallholders Party returned to its 1931 program. I quote, therefore, the relating part of a speech delivered by the Smallholders Party's leader:

Nobody should dream of the return of the counts, the bankers, and capitalists. Their time has definitely passed by. If somebody is a true follower of the Smallholders Party, then he has to go further ahead than the programs of 1939 and 1945. We will defend the rights of the individual peasants as well as those who wish still to remain within the cooperatives.

The above-mentioned delegation brands even the Hungarian Independence Party as a counterrevolutionary organization which defined its aims as follows:

Internal peace in Hungary, national independence, freedom of speech, press, assembling, religion, and cultural work, as well as the free choice of working places.

10. The second Soviet aggression: Hungary had its first independent government since 1947. By name the ministers with portfolios of the Stalinist times are still there. The capital and the countryside demands continuously the reorganization of the Government on the basis of the 1945 coalition. This is how the so-called cabinet government came into being with 3-3 representatives in it for each party. Experts are appointed as Secretaries of State to all ministries.

The people now trust its government. And though it was the slogan during the revolution and the freedom fight that "We will not work until the Russians leave the country" work resumed in the much suffered capital on November 1 and 2. It was a wonderful moment to see the force and the sacrifice which moves the whole

Hungarian people. Adults, young and old, children, work in excellent humor to clear away the ruins and rubbish. They said:

We are ready to work for 16 hours too, thereafter, even if we are paid only for 8, finally we work for ourselves.

Peasant lorries and coaches transport food to the capital from the surrounding villages and faraway places freely distributing potatoes, poultry, eggs, and so forth. In several houses of Budapest people awoke in the morning by realizing that the main entry was blocked by these freely given heaps of potatoes.

The trucks of factories sent into the countryside for food came back full of supplies and the peasants would not accept money in return. The peaceful reconstruction work began within the country. The new police consists of the former regular police and the freedom fighters. Atrocities stopped. On November 2 and 3, 1956, the public security was irreproachable.

When the Soviet armies were withdrawn, the Soviet Government thought that the Hungarian Government will not be able to reestablish order.

In 2 days' time it was proven that the revolution would not proceed further since the counterrevolution did not have a root in the Hungarian people. The slogans on the Budapest streets were: "We will not return lands and factories."

The Soviet was motivated to quick action and intervention by this peaceful work. The Government officially received a reply from Moscow which insured the withdrawal of Soviet citizens from Hungary. Soviet armored divisions close around Budapest. Maleter issues strict orders to avoid all clashes with Soviet troops if they do not attack.

Hungary withdraws from the Warsaw Pact and declares her neutrality. She turns to the United Nations and the great powers for recognition of her neutrality and the sending of a U. N. committee to Hungary. She protests against the influx of Soviet troops to the Soviet Government on two separate occasions. She asks that trials begin on the basis of the October 30 Moscow declarations.

On November 3, the Soviet sends a military committee consisting of high-ranking officers to discuss the method of withdrawing Soviet troops. The agreement is concluded after six and a half hours discussions. The Soviet delegation asks that the discussions should continue at 10 p. m. to talk about technical details.

Following the communiqués optimism is felt in the entire city. On Saturday evening after a long, long time the people of Budapest went to sleep calmly.

At 5 o'clock in the morning they were awakened by cannon fire. A burning ring of flame appears around Budapest. This is the first time since the Soviet besieged Berlin that such a large scale ground attack has been launched against a capital. Within a period of 2 weeks the Soviet has begun its second war against the Hungarian people.

After Imre Nagy makes his speech, turning to U. N. for help, the Council of Ministers convenes in the Parliament. Andropov, the Soviet Ambassador, calls Imre Nagy and Geza Losonczy, the two Communist ministers, for a discussion. The connection to the Hungarian military delegation is disrupted. Imre Nagy and Geza Losonczy leave for the discussion, although it is clear why they were

invited. Therefore, as we were later informed, they went not to the Soviet, but to the Yugoslav Embassy.

The Soviet Union attacks with numerically superior forces. Soviet tanks approach. The members of the Government draw up a protest note to the Great Powers and hand it over to the respective ministers. After that they leave the Parliament with one exception. Soviet tanks encircle the Parliament. Soviet soldiers flood the whole building. Kristof, former minister to Moscow, comes with us. The member of the Government hands over the note of protest and informs them that the Government of Imre Nagy will not resign and considers the attack as illegal.

Hungary loses her independence and becomes a Soviet colony again.

11. Soviet strategy and tactics: The Soviet had fixed plans. The way they fight is terrible. The resistance was not yet organized. Only guerrilla fighting is possible. Notwithstanding, they destroy the region where the heaviest fighting took place between October 24 and 30, 1956.

I saw myself that, for example, in Buda, where our stronghold was set up on the Szena-Square during the first part of the fighting, that on November 4, 1956, about noon, on Sunday, 10 Russian tanks came from the Margaret Bridge with guns alternately directed against the two sides of the street. They shot all the houses within about a mile. Many houses, homes were destroyed and many lives were taken, including those of children and women. When they finally reached the Szena-Square, they shot for hours the whole region in a circle of about 1 kilometer.

The situation was the same in Buda on the Becsi-ut (Vienna land road). A mine was thrown on one of the tanks from a school at Becsi-ut and Szepvolgyi-ut corner. Three other Russian tanks fled to the Zsigmond-Square, about 500 meters in the direction of the city and they destroyed every building there. In one of the buildings an infant of 2 years old and his mother and a 65-year-old man died there.

The freedom fighters went into office, administrative office and executive office buildings or former party headquarters in order to save the private property, homes, and the civilian population. They realized after 3 days, that it had no effect, as the Russians fled from the spot they were attacked and destroyed from a safe distance the whole region. Therefore, they left the city and went into the mountains surrounding Buda.

Daily Swiss radio stations broadcast several special messages to Hungary during the fighting with the following text: According to the Geneva agreement, every nation should honor the stipulations.

1. Those not fighting should be spared.
2. Taking hostages is illegal and strictly forbidden.
3. The enemy should not be wounded or killed if he surrenders.

On October 25, 1956, they shot into the line of civilians waiting for bread before a bakery at the Szent Istvan Square and Furst Sandor-utca corner. Two persons died and several were injured. Between October 24 and 27, 1956, the ambulance cars did not transfer the injured to hospitals as the Russians took them away after their wounds have been treated and shot them. The ambulance cars were not allowed to enter the battle scene as a result of which loss of blood caused a large number of deaths among the wounded. On November 6, 1956, the Russians collected young men of 15 to 25 years of age

in the houses on Moricz Zsigmond Circle, they were brought before the houses and shot dead on the spot.

There was not a single hospital in Budapest which had not been damaged by gunfire although they were marked with big red crosses. I saw myself the gunning of the Irgalmas Hospital and the Attila Jozsef Hospital. Freedom fighters surrendering in accordance with the amnesty government decree were collected and shot. This was the reason that after this event nobody was willing to surrender.

12. The role played by Kadar: Janos Kadar was one of the victims of the Rakosi regime. As a former Minister of the Interior, he was arrested, his teeth were knocked out and he was finally castrated, while tortured in the AVO. He was on the side of the revolution with Imre Nagy. This is clearly shown in his two radio speeches delivered on October 30, 1956, at 1428 hours and November 1, 1956, at 2100 hours. I call to the attention of the committee Kadar's two speeches published by Free Europe Committee, The Revolt in Hungary, October 23, 1956-November 4, 1956; October 30, at 1428 hours, on page 43; and November 1, at 2100 hours, on page 64. (Speeches referred to follow:)

MINISTER OF STATE JANOS KADAR

(October 30, 1956)

I want you to know that all the resolutions passed today by the Council of Ministers have been fully approved by the presidium of the Hungarian Workers' Party and I want to add that I fully approve of all that was said by the speakers before me—Imre Nagy, Zoltan Tildy and Ferenc Erdei * * * I speak to Communists, those Communists who were prompted by the progressive ideas of mankind and socialism to join the party. * * * Comrades, * * * owing to the leadership of the past years our party has been cast under a grave shadow. We must rid our party of this burden, of all the accusations hurled at it. This must be done with a clear conscience and with * * * courageous resolve. The ranks of the party will shake, but I am sure that no * * * honest, sincere Communist will leave the party. Those who joined us for selfish personal reasons * * * will be the ones who leave. But having rid ourselves of this ballast and the burden of past crimes committed by certain persons in our leadership, we will fight * * * under more favorable conditions for our ideas, our people, and our country. I ask every Communist individually to set an example worthy of a man and a Communist by restoring order, beginning normal life, resuming work * * * and laying the foundations of an ordered life. Only by doing so can we earn the respect of our countrymen.

November 1, 1956

Dear listeners, Janos Kadar will now speak to the Hungarian people:

"Hungarian workers, peasants and intellectuals. * * * In a glorious uprising our people have shaken off the Rakosi regime. They have achieved freedom for the people and independence for the country, without which there can be no socialism. We can safely say that * * * those who prepared this uprising were recruited from our ranks. Communist writers, journalists, university students, the youth of the Petofi Club, thousands and thousands of workers and peasants and veteran fighters who were imprisoned on false charges fought in the front lines against Rakosi's despotism and political hooliganism. We are proud that you have stood your ground honestly in the armed uprising. * * * You were permeated by true patriotism and loyalty to socialism. * * *

"We have come to a crossroads in our uprising. The Hungarian democratic parties must [now] choose between stabilizing our achievements or facing an open counterrevolution. * * * We did not fight in order that mines and factories might be snatched from the hands of the working class and the land from the hands of the peasantry. * * * Either the uprising secures the basic achievements of democracy * * * or we sink back into the slavery of the world of the

gentry * * * and into the service of foreigners. The grave and alarming danger exists that foreign armed intervention may allot to our country the tragic fate of Korea. * * * We must eliminate the nests of counterrevolution.

"In these momentous hours, the Communists who fought against Rakosi's despotism have * * * decided to form a new party. * * * In these momentous hours, we call on every Hungarian worker who is inspired by affection for the people and the country to join our party, whose name is the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. A preparatory committee has been formed whose members are: Ferenc Donath, Janos Kadar, Sandor Kopacsi, Geza Losonczy, Gyorgy Lukacs, Imre Nagy, and Zoltan Szanto. This committee will begin to organize the party, will supervise its operations temporarily and will convene as soon as possible a national statutory meeting. The party will publish a paper entitled Nepszabadsag.

"Workers, peasants, and intellectuals. The new party, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, is prepared to do its share in fighting for the consolidation of independence and democracy. * * * We turn to the newly-formed democratic parties—first of all * * * to the Social Democratic Party—with the request that they help consolidate the government and thereby overcome the danger of menacing countries and intervention from abroad."

Kadar was called to the Soviet Embassy on November 2, 1956, by Ambassador Andropov, when he disappeared. His followers, the so-called Rajkists in the Communist Party, gave the following description of him in their radio station on November 1, 3, and 5, 1956. (See Revolt in Hungary, p. 63, Rajk's radio address on November 1, at 1750; also Rajk's radio address on November 3, at 1830, p. 82; also on November 5, 1956, at 1730, p. 92.)

Mr. ARENS. Mr. Kiss, I notice that you have a document. Are these radio addresses contained in that document?

Mr. KISS. Yes.

RADIO [FREE] RAJK

(November 1, 1956)

* * * [Communist dictators have been] hunting for us and our station because they do not understand the degree of the nation's dissatisfaction and despair. * * * Comrades, if the Communist Party wishes to continue in the leading and guiding role * * * it must proclaim and demand immediately and loudly all that the Hungarian people rightfully demand. It is up to us, the Communist Party, officially and publicly * * * to ask the Russian and fraternal * * * Communist Parties * * * for our immediate release from the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of the Russian Army from our country. * * *

Rakosi's salami tactics backfired and brought catastrophe because they cut off the people's freedom slice by slice. * * * The Soviet leaders must see that they cannot change the beliefs * * * of our nation by using bayonets, nor can Hungarian youth be won over to the lofty tenets of Marxism-Leninism by attempts to transform them into Russians, by declaring that learning the Russian language is their main task. * * *

We demand that Janos Kadar, temporary chief of the party, publicly * * * call upon the leadership of the U. S. S. R. and the Soviet and fraternal Communist parties and make them see that the Hungarian Communist Party is fighting for survival and that it can survive only if it serves the interests of the Hungarian people.

RADIO [FREE] RAJK

(November 3, 1956)

It is the duty of the six-member [party] committee headed by Janos Kadar to go to Moscow immediately to begin negotiations with the Communist Party leadership, with every one of its members * * * to send telegrams to the French, Italian and German Communist Parties. Let us explain to our Russian and other comrades abroad that there was a time, when the liberating Soviet Army reached the frontiers of Hungary [1944], when at least half of the nation placed its trust in the Communist Party. Let us explain with blunt frankness that, as a

result of the behavior of the occupying Soviet Army, we obtained only one-sixth of the vote in the ensuing free election.

Tell them frankly that our party today is altogether on the brink of bankruptcy, as a result of the past few bloody days and the irresponsible mass-murder by Russian officers, and we [Communists] are worse off than in 1945 when we started. Tell our comrades that a new occupation may assure that Hungary will remain a Russian colony for some time; it is not even impossible that a new Rakosi or a new Gero may report on paper to Moscow a new Communist Party in Hungary, and even extort dues from the members by means of bayonets. But the lofty tenets of Marxism-Leninism on communism will have disappeared without trace from our country.

RADIO [FREE] RAJK

(November 5, 1956)

"While thousands of Hungarian patriots were massacred by tanks and guns * * * there were traitors * * * who under the leadership of the new Rakosi, Janos Kadar, accepted the services of the bloody Russian terrorist regime.

We have very little to say to the Soviet masters. They have convinced not only the whole world, but also all Communists, that they do not care for communism at all and that they simply prostituted communism * * * to Russian imperialism. At the U. N. General Assembly, the whole world expressed its opinion, an opinion which at last acknowledged * * * that the Russians * * * have used communism as a Trojan horse * * * to keep their colonies by massacre and terror.

But we also want to speak of the traitors * * * the Janos Kaders, who play the dirty role of colonial governors * * *. We send them the message that we consider them all traitors to communism. * * * These gangsters will continue Rakosi's work by falsifying historical events—not only those of 1945, but those of yesterday and the day before * * * lying to the effect that by the brutal massacre they "liberated" this unhappy country from reactionary counterrevolutionaries, as Moscow lied to the world last week. Comrades, we will continue the struggle of true Communists * * * both above ground and underground. We do not promise that Janos Kadar * * * will be called to account * * * because his crime and that of his accomplices is clear and the sentence has already been pronounced. We Hungarian Communists will see to it that the sentence is carried out.

Mr. ARENS. Proceed, Mr. Kiss.

Mr. KISS. These are the facts, behind which are seen all the confessions and played parts of the Communist show trials. It is evident where the human being fades away and where the puppet comes in the foreground.

Mr. ARENS. We thank you for these statements, gentlemen.

Now, if it meets with your pleasure, we have some questions we would like to pose to you.

First of all, could you tell us when it was that you were last on Hungarian soil?

Mr. HORVATH. Yes, sir. It was November 11.

Mr. ARENS. November 11 of 1956?

Mr. HORVATH. Yes. We came from Hungary November 11, after the second Russian aggression started on November 4, and when the fighting against the Russians came to a stage when we could see that the Russians crushed the Hungarian free government and the free Hungary.

Mr. ARENS. When did you actually arrive in the United States?

Mr. HORVATH. I arrived here on December 5, 1956.

Mr. ARENS. When did Mr. Kiss arrive?

Mr. KISS. December 9, 1956.

Mr. ARENS. Have you, since you left Hungarian soil, maintained direct contact with friends and associates in Hungary who have kept you advised of the current situation in that country?

Mr. HORVATH. Yes. But these contacts are something the people know generally. We were among the leaders of the revolution. We were leaders of the parties and revolutionary organizations. We knew the opinion of our friends, who are also the leaders of the Hungarian freedom movement. When we saw that the Hungarian revolution was crushed, we met and discussed the situation. We came to the free world to represent free Hungary, because at home the leaders of the Hungarian people cannot state their opinions.

Mr. ARENS. You have current information?

Mr. HORVATH. Yes.

Mr. ARENS. Would you tell us on the basis of current information you have respecting the situation in Hungary, just what is that situation now?

Mr. HORVATH. Perhaps I ought to say more than everybody can see in the newspapers, because what is in the newspapers everybody knows.

At present the Hungarian people cannot do anything because they know that last October and November when there was an opportunity to free Hungary nothing happened on the part of the free world. Only political and diplomatic help was necessary, but even this did not come. Therefore, open revolution and open uprising are not useful. The Hungarian people know that from experience.

Therefore, our friends, the Hungarian free people, think there is only one way: To take passive resistance, and the ways of that are very different. We hear different news about that and you know this from the newspapers and from some information. But until the Hungarian people see that, generally, the opinion of the great powers and the United Nations will change, the Hungarian people themselves will not and cannot do more. We did more last October, and the world waited.

Mr. ARENS. I understood you to say in our informal conversation before we proceeded on this record that you had information respecting the willingness of the Soviet leaders to recognize a coalition government during the period of the revolution in Hungary. Could you tell us about that, please?

Mr. HORVATH. First, I can mention what was openly declared by the Soviet leaders, by the Soviet representatives. The first is the declaration of October 13, when in Moscow the official Soviet source declared that they were negotiating about the restoration of Hungary. That was a positive declaration. At the same time in Hungary there was Mr. Mikoyan. He discussed the Hungarian situation, first, with the Communist leaders and with Gerö, who was the secretary general of the Communist Party. And when Mikoyan saw that there was no solution to the Hungarian situation as they wanted to keep Hungary under Soviet occupation, they made that proclamation in Moscow, that I mentioned before, and in Hungary he began to discuss the situation with the leaders of the Hungarian Democratic Parties, first, with Zoltan Tildy, who is a former president of Hungary. And this discussion was between Mikoyan and Tildy. Later on, other leaders of the Hungarian revolution took part, namely, Imre Nagy.

Mr. Mikoyan told that he and the Soviet Government know that there is no other solution for Hungary than to build up a democratic coalition government in Budapest. He accepted the situation in existence after the Second World War, when four parties took part in the coalition. Those were: the Small Holders Party, the Social Democrat Party, the Peasant Party, and the Communist Party. Mikoyan agreed that we can repeat the coalition government as it was in 1945-46.

(Mrs. Elizabeth Vasvary, secretary to Ferenc Nagy, entered the room.)

Mr. HORVATH. I think it would be better perhaps if Mrs. Vasvary would translate.

(At this point Mrs. Vasvary acted as an interpreter.)

Mr. HORVATH. After this discussion and argument, there came into power the new coalition government of Imre Nagy. The Nagy government was not formed against the Russians, but it was more or less formed as a coalition which would cooperate with them, not in opposition, in other words. Therefore, it had the approval of the Russians.

When they found out that Russian troops and Russian tanks were on the move in Hungary, the coalition government turned to the representatives of the Soviet Union and to the Ambassador to try to cooperate also for information. The Soviet Ambassador assured the Nagy government that these movements of the tanks and of the army were not pointed against the Hungarians or the coalition government, that it was merely a preparation for the promised withdrawal of the Soviet forces. The Government received repeated assurances on that.

They accepted this assurance of the Soviet Ambassador in good faith. They felt completely that this was done with the purpose of aiding Hungary by the withdrawal of the Soviet forces. They felt completely that this withdrawal was a bona fide withdrawal, especially since the Soviet troops seemed to have the same feeling that they were withdrawing rather than being used to fight in the country.

They suffered serious losses, both in their tanks and in the armed forces, and they had to withdraw from the city of Budapest to rebuild their forces.

Based on this proposed withdrawal, which they felt was a true withdrawal, they believed that the forces would not be ready or would not regroup for a second attack, which finally did occur. They did not believe that such an event would be possible.

Soviet Pravda and other sources, the broadcasts, and so on, all indicated that this was a withdrawal and not any attempt of staying or remaining in Hungary and, therefore, these people, the Hungarians, felt that this was a completely above-board operation.

I feel that it is extremely important to note what the opinion of Imre Nagy, who was a Communist and who had been in Moscow for 15 years, was about these events. Imre Nagy was firmly convinced that this withdrawal was a bona fide withdrawal and that there was no danger of a second breakthrough of the Russian tanks.

I am familiar with some of the discussions which he carried on about this matter. One very important event which happened was that late on the evening of the 3d of November the Ambassadors of the satellite countries went to visit Imre Nagy to discuss the development. These Ambassadors reproached Imre Nagy for breaking away

from the Soviet and declaring what Imre Nagy had declared—the neutrality and breaking away from the Soviet Government. Why did he declare that Hungary would become neutral? Why did he withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, when Imre Nagy was perfectly aware of the fact that the Soviet Union is strong and that they do not fool around with such questions?

Imre Nagy stated that he was perfectly aware of the fact that the Soviet pays a great deal of attention to world public opinion and to international opinion on these subjects.

When they pointed out to Imre Nagy that the Soviet had 20 divisions in the country, he said that he understood that, but he still felt that these 20 divisions were not a threat to the welfare of the country. Imre Nagy felt that the Soviet could not take the chance of fighting against the public opinion behind the Iron Curtain, in Western European countries, or world public opinion in this particular matter.

I would like to finish this phase of my testimony by stating that the Hungarian people on the 3d and 4th of November did not believe that it was possible that the Soviet would begin a new aggression, because we were familiar with the Charter of the United Nations, the public opinion of world leaders, and therefore we felt that there was no danger of such an action.

Mr. ARENS. I should like to thank you for that résumé.

I would like to pose this question, which either of you could answer.

On the basis of the contacts which you presently have in Hungary what is the situation there currently?

Mr. HORVATH. The present situation in Hungary is one of terror because of the people being taken to prison, torture chambers, and being executed almost without a hearing.

Mr. ARENS. How many people have been deported by the Soviets from Hungary into Siberia since the suppression of the revolution?

Mr. HORVATH. It is very hard to ascertain the number of deportees. There were mass deportations following the November 3–November 4 events. But since the public opinion of the world protested so vehemently, these stopped to some extent and some people have been returned from deportation.

Mr. KISS. A conservative estimate would be between 40,000 and 50,000 of my countrymen.

Mr. ARENS. Do you have information respecting the number of Soviet secret police or Soviet forces that are now in Hungary? That is as to army, secret police, and the like.

Mr. HORVATH. After the revolution when the Russians attacked Hungary once more, the second aggression, there were in Hungary about 20 divisions.

Mr. ARENS. How many men are there in a Russian division?

Mr. HORVATH. Perhaps 12,000 or 15,000.

Mr. ARENS. And now?

Mr. HORVATH. I do not think there are at present.

Mr. ARENS. I should like to know what the situation is now from the standpoint of the Russian forces.

Mr. HORVATH. About 200,000 or 300,000 Russian Soviet soldiers are in Hungary at present.

Mr. ARENS. Is the record clear that there are at the present time between 200,000 and 300,000 Russian soldiers on Hungarian soil?

Mr. HORVATH. Yes.

Mr. KISS. In anticipation of any disturbances on March 15, which is the Hungarian Independence Day, they brought in new Soviet forces. Two tank divisions, armored divisions, were brought in in addition to the 4 which were already stationed there, and there was information to the effect that 2 further divisions were on a standby basis.

Mr. ARENS. Could you give us further detail about the reign of terror that you started to describe?

Mr. KISS. There are two phases of the terror after the 4th of November. The first is where people gave themselves up with the understanding that they might be pardoned, but these were ruthlessly murdered by the existing Hungarian Government in connection with the Soviets.

In Miskolc, Hungary, 56 people were executed up to the middle of November for participation in the liberation fight. There were no trials. In Eger, 23 people were executed without trial. In Salgotarjan 17 people were executed. In Pesterzsébet 19 people were executed without trial. In the Forest of Bakony, which was a center of the freedom fighters, 20 people were executed according to the testimony of one who escaped. From the miners at Komlo 11 people were executed. All of these without a trial.

Mr. ARENS. Who did the executing?

Mr. KISS. The Russian Army.

These executions were all done by the Russian forces since the Hungarian Army and the police were so disorganized.

In the middle of November they began a sort of reorganization of the Hungarian police with the help of Russians.

As of the 5th of January these groups were as follows: The first group consisted of from 10,000 to 12,000 former officers and secret police. As of the 5th of January they regrouped the Hungarian Army and secret police by making the first division, which consisted of from 10,000 to 12,000 former officers and secret police of Hungary. These were entrusted with taking over by degrees the power from the Russians which the Russians held previously. The Hungarians were systematically going to take over this power by degrees.

The second group consisted of from 5,000 to 6,000 former AVO people, the Hungarian secret police. This consisted of the former sadistic groups who had been very active in the secret police. These people were entrusted with finding and seeking out the former freedom fighters.

Then they have the police themselves numbering about 15,000 to 18,000.

They also have the border police guard who may total about 15,000.

These people, whom they trust, receive the amount of 500 forints, the Hungarian unit of money, a day, which would total 15,000 forints during the month and this, in turn, would be 15 times the money that a worker can earn.

The secret police are Russians dressed in civilian clothes who, in turn, watch and have a counterespionage system against the former AVO's and the Hungarians in order to find out who is trustworthy.

In this particular group of 5,000, the Russians are the only ones who can be trusted. The others have joined the police force because they are unemployed and because they need to work.

The largest prison in Budapest is guarded by Russian soldiers, Russian units. On the third floor of this prison they have a special grouping of the NKVD, the Soviet secret police, which try to terrorize the people into giving information that they are spying for the West, or that they were directed by the West during the revolution. This is where Gen. Pal Maleter is being tortured. He is the former defense minister in the coalition government and he, according to the last information, has been bearing up extremely well despite the fact that they want to put on a show-trial with General Maleter as their chief victim.

Mr. ARENS. Do you have any information respecting their torture methods?

Mr. KISS. We feel that the Russians might have some new torture methods, but we can give you the torture methods of the AVO from personal experience because both of us have undergone such torture.

Mr. ARENS. Proceed to do so, if you please.

Mr. KISS. I know of these methods because in 1944 both Mr. Horvath and myself were in the prison of the Gestapo and in 1947 we were under AVO, the Hungarian secret police, supervision for a period of 3 years.

The first thing that they do when you enter this AVO prison is that they try to impress upon you if you make statements that would turn out the way they want it, then they will promise you everything. They also make definite promises if you give incriminating evidence against other people whom they would like to see involved.

If they do not get results by this method, then they start the torture which at first is a mild form of torture. This consists of standing with the arms behind you against a wall until you just drop from exhaustion. The next is that you have to face a huge reflector and if you do not face it then you are stricken on the head with something from behind. They take you back to your cell and as soon as they find that you are going to sleep they knock on the door and pick you up and take you up for questioning again. In other words, they do not let the person sleep. This goes on for days, and if they do not get results under such torture they start the physical beatings and they knock out their teeth and they put fiery pins, pins which have been heated, red-hot needles, under their fingernails.

Mr. Kadar, the present head of the Hungarian Government, underwent similar torture. They knocked out all of his teeth and he was also castrated. Mr. Kadar told this story about himself in a meeting held at Communist Party headquarters in June. He stated that General Farkas and his son tortured him personally. It may be of interest to know that General Farkas and his son were the ones who tortured the present head of the Hungarian Government, Mr. Kadar.

Mr. ARENS. Tell us who runs the Hungarian Government at the present time?

Mr. KISS. The Kadar government with six people, I understand.

Mr. ARENS. Is the Kadar government a puppet of Moscow?

Mr. KISS. Completely so. The Kadar government works under the supervision and the direction of Moscow.

Mr. ARENS. What are the conditions now of the rank and file of the people of Hungary?

Mr. KISS. In spite of all attempts the Communist Party cannot be reconstituted. The people will simply not cooperate.

Mr. ARENS. What is their economic condition?

Mr. HORVATH. Perhaps before we go into the economic condition, may I state for the record that in 1945 17 percent of the Hungarian people were Communists and before the days of the revolution perhaps there were 5 or 6 percent of the Hungarian people who were Communists. That was what Kadar said and what the Communists said in their days. But presently, after the revolution and after the Soviet aggression, you cannot find 1 percent of the Hungarian people who would be Communist.

I know many times in different newspapers and in many statements that politicians make, that the Hungarian people are 90 percent against communism. It is not 90 percent, but it is more than 99 percent. Anyone who knows the situation is sure of that.

Mr. ARENS. Tell us what are the economic conditions in Hungary at the present time?

Mr. KISS. According to official Communist estimates the unemployed in Hungary at present are 200,000, but other people who have come out of Hungary state this number to be closer to 350,000. The people of Budapest through the packages received from the West, of which a considerable amount has come into the country, are taken care of as far as their food situation is concerned. The people in the provinces who raise their own food have something to eat, but they have no clothing whatsoever. The unemployed are really starving because they are scattered in various areas.

Mr. ARENS. What is the attitude of the people of Hungary toward the West?

Mr. KISS. The people of Hungary have been bitterly disappointed with the West. This feeling is an all-pervasive feeling, but they hate the Soviet more.

Mr. HORVATH. The people of Hungary feel that the countries of the United Nations did not do what they promised and what is in the United Nations Charter and what was the opinion of the different leaders of the great powers and the Western World about the satellite countries during the last 10 years.

Mr. ARENS. Do the people of Hungary feel that the free countries of the world betrayed them?

Mr. HORVATH. Yes, that is the feeling of the Hungarian people. That I want to emphasize.

Mr. ARENS. How many lives were lost in the Hungarian revolution?

Mr. KISS. Official reports claim only 1,800 people died in the revolution, but our information is that over 25,000 people lost their lives.

Mr. ARENS. Of these 25,000, how many were the freedom fighters, the Hungarian people?

Mr. HORVATH. The greatest part of this were not freedom fighters, but only peaceful people who were walking in the street.

Mr. ARENS. How did they lose their lives?

Mr. HORVATH. They took part in the demonstrations, the children, school girls and old people who were waiting before a shop. They had gone shopping. Before the Parliament Building about 500 or 600 people were killed in half an hour. Among them there were many

little children 5 or 6 years old. They were with their parents. They were going along the street.

Mr. ARENS. In these torture operations that you were discussing, do they imprison and torture women and children as well as men?

Mr. HORVATH. Women are also tortured and lately in the schools they have news that two 12-year-old girls were beaten up so severely because they were singing about freedom that they became insane. The children in the schools are just completely unmanageable. On the 23d of each month the children appear in school with black clothes, indicating mourning on the anniversary of the revolution. The revolution began on the 23d of October and the children wear mourning colors.

Mr. ARENS. Do the people of Hungary see any hope in the future?

Mr. KISS. The quest for freedom and liberty has become a religion in Hungary. The people say that it is better to die than to live under such conditions. They are ready to do so.

Mr. ARENS. What do the people of Hungary think that the West should have done that it did not do?

Mr. KISS. I feel that, if the West had followed through, they could have aided Hungary in her fight for freedom. I will tell you step by step what I feel should have been done.

On the 23d of October the Hungarians in a matter of 3 hours won their freedom; 99 percent of the people were agreed that communism must be banished. The Hungarian freedom fighters took over the radio of Hungary. At this point, on the morning of 24th of October, the Russians intervened. On the 24th of October a Soviet-Hungarian war broke out, the first Soviet military assault on a satellite since 1945. They felt that the appearance of Russian tanks on the streets of Budapest would in 1 hour take care of the situation. The heroism of the youth, young people, and the people themselves created a modern miracle. The Hungarian people took up the fight and in 5 days, from the 24th to the 29th of October, they completely conquered the then existing Soviet Army.

They got arms partly from the Soviet soldiers, and they also initiated the so-called Molotov cocktail, which was very effectively put to use.

The Hungarian people expected that the United Nations would convene the General Assembly on the 24th of October, and this was not done until 5 or 6 days later. By the time that the General Assembly convened there was much Hungarian blood shed. The Soviet was greatly encouraged by this lapse of inactivity on the part of the United Nations.

Mr. HORVATH. It was underlined. That was the crux of the whole thing. The Soviet Union was encouraged.

Mr. KISS. The people felt that this intervention by the Soviet was completely against the provisions of the Warsaw Pact or the peace treaty. The Soviet countermanded every provision of the Warsaw Pact by interfering in Hungary. If the—

Mr. HORVATH. Security Council.

Mr. KISS. —had convened and dealt with this matter, the Soviet no doubt would have vetoed any action. This should have been brought to the General Assembly's attention immediately, since speed was necessary.

The United Nations Charter clearly states that in the event of aggression the armed forces must be—the U. N. must arrange the cease-fire.

Mr. HORVATH. In any such case of aggression, the U. N. is entrusted with arranging the armistice or the cease-fire.

Mr. KISS. The General Assembly dealt with the Hungarian question, but they did not set a time limit under which these provisions should have been taken care of, and they did not provide for any sanctions, which is in itself in the—

Mr. ARENS. May I interpose this question there? If the United States Government and the governments of the West had severed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and its satellites upon the instigation or upon the initiation of the military action by the Soviets against Hungary, what would have been the impact upon the people of Hungary fighting for their freedom?

Mr. KISS. Even speaking of severing diplomatic relations would have had the effect of deterring the Soviet Union from further activity. Therefore, we feel that that would have been an extremely valuable step at that time.

It is amazing to us to have the feeling that when we leave the terrorism which was existing in Hungary and come toward the West that there is a gradual and much more apparent fear of the Soviet. In other words, the fear of the Soviet seems much more apparent here than it does over there.

Mr. HORVATH. The Hungarian people themselves are not afraid of the Soviet, but as you leave the borders of the country somehow this seems a much deeper feeling as you come toward the West.

Mr. KISS. The Soviet forces in Hungary were cooperating with the Hungarian people inasmuch as 10 Soviet tanks went over with their people to the Hungarian fighters. The Soviet Army is completely demoralized, the ones who are in Hungary and possibly elsewhere.

Incidentally, it is significant that every time these Soviet soldiers came across a body of water, they asked whether this was the Suez Canal.

The first group which had been in Hungary were locked up in their quarters, and the new soldiers took over in order to protect themselves. The Soviet soldiers who were in Hungary with the first group, according to present information, are being taken back to Russia and they are going to be put in forced labor camps, and so on, because of their fraternizing with the Hungarians in the first wave. We know of several instances where Soviet soldiers were shot and killed on the spot because they spoke to Hungarians on the street. We know that if a Russian soldier fraternizes with a Hungarian it demoralizes him.

It may be interesting to note that prisoners of war who had been in Russia for the past 10 years returned home to Hungary during the period of the summer months, last year. According to them, the Russian people were all convinced that in time the West would come and liberate them from the oppression of their Soviet masters.

Even in Russia only the higher echelon are the ones who are truly Communists. The people themselves, if they were granted the opportunity, would become anti-Communist.

I feel that if the United Nations had succeeded in getting an observer team into Hungary and would have taken the neutralization

of Hungary seriously and recognized her withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, this would have saved the Hungarian people, since this would have meant that the United Nations and the Western World recognized the right to self-government, freedom, and independence for Hungary.

Mr. ARENS. We thank you very much, gentlemen, for your appearance today, and we hope that the years that lie ahead for you personally will be most fruitful and that you will have a new life here of service and security in this country in the years to come.

(Whereupon, at 12:05 p. m., Wednesday, March 20, 1957, the staff consultations were concluded.)

INDEX

INDIVIDUALS

	Page
Andropov, Yuri V	21, 24
Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, Endre	2
Donath, Ferenc	24
Dudas, Joseph	18-20
Erdei, Ferenc	23
Farkas, Ferenc	30
Gerő, Erno	5, 6, 11, 12, 14-17, 26
Gomulka, Wladyslaw	15
Hegedus, Andras	6, 13-17
Horvath, Janos	1, 2, 3-8 (statement), 25-28 (statement), 30, 31-33 (statement)
Kadar, Janos	6, 19, 20, 23-25, 30, 31
Kalmar, Joseph	18
Kiraly, Bela	16
Kiss, Sandor	1, 2, 8-25 (statement), 28-34 (statement)
Kopacsi, Sandor	24
Kristof, Istvan	22
Losonczy, Geza	21, 24
Lukacs, Gyorgy	24
Maleter, Pal	10, 21, 30
Mikoyan, Anastas I	16-18, 26, 27
Nagy, Imre	6, 7, 9, 12-19, 21-24, 26-28
Piros, Laszlo	11
Rajk, Laszlo	8, 24
Rakosi, Matyas	4, 8, 15, 17, 19, 23-25
Szanto, Zoltan	24
Tildy, Zoltan	23, 26
Zelk, Zoltan	15

ORGANIZATIONS

Hungarian Independence Party	20
Hungarian National Peasant Party	8, 27
Hungarian National Revolutionary Council	19
Hungarian Peasant Alliance	2
Hungarian Peasant Association	2, 8
Hungarian Smallholders' Party	2, 3, 8, 20, 27
Hungarian Social Democratic Party	8, 24, 27
Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party	24
Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party	23, 27
Politburo	11, 12
Hungarian Writers' Association	15, 16
National Youth Organization (MADISZ)	2
Petofi Circle	16
Revolutionary Council of Hungary. (See Hungarian National Revolutionary Council.)	
Workers' Councils	2, 6

PUBLICATIONS

Egyetemi Ifjusag (University Youth)	14
Magyar Fuggetlenseg (Hungarian Independence)	19
Revolt in Hungary, The	23
Szabad Nep	19