


**A
Brief**

**PHILOSOPHY
OF
HISTORY**



**Patterns of Our
Cultural Development**

by Mór Kármán

PRESENTED WITH OUR COMPLIMENTS.....

For your library collection and reading, this small volume by Mór Kárman, A Brief Philosophy of History, Patterns of our Cultural Development, is the work of a distinguished Hungarian educator, philosopher, and cultural historian.

Mór Kárman's varied and penetrating writings and his profound role in developing and structuring Hungary's modern educational system are of paramount significance. The cultural and intellectual history of Hungary are intertwined over a period of 50 years with his remarkable contributions to education.

Mór Kárman was born in Szeged, Hungary, on December 25, 1843, and died in Budapest on October 14, 1915. One of his sons, Dr. Theodore von Kárman, is remembered in the United States of America and throughout the world in his own right for his unexcelled contributions to aerodynamics, engineering, science and education.

AMERICAN HUNGARIAN STUDIES FOUNDATION
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A Brief Philosophy of History

A BRIEF
PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
Patterns of Our Cultural Development

by
MÓR KÁRMÁN

Edited and with a Forward
by August J. Molnar

AMERICAN HUNGARIAN STUDIES FOUNDATION
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Foreword

This work by Mór Kármán has been translated and published in fulfillment of the terms of the bequest of Theodore von Kármán, the author's son. In his will Dr. von Kármán, who died at age 82 on May 7, 1963, left a generous fund to the American Hungarian Studies Foundation. Through the fund the Foundation maintains the collection of his father's writings and here has published a translation of one of Mór Kármán's treatises.

A *Brief Philosophy of History* was chosen for publication, because in his lifetime Theodore von Kármán himself exhibited great interest in having this work shared with others. In fact, he had a quantity of offprints prepared from the original Hungarian publication.

Some may view this publication primarily as the reflection of a son's affectionate tribute to the memory of a brilliant father. Above all, the publication of this work was motivated by a son's objective desire to have this distinguished Hungarian educator, philosopher and cultural historian known before a wider audience. Mór Kármán's varied and penetrating writings and his profound role in developing and structuring Hungary's modern educational system are of paramount significance. The cultural and intellectual history of Hungary are intertwined over a period of 50 years with his contributions to education and these include: the new gymnasium curriculum adopted in 1879; founding of the new teacher's college in 1872 with the Model Gymnasium; a new series of textbooks; new texts and courses in educational methods; editing the journal, *Magyar Tanügy* (Hungarian Education); serving as Secretary General of the National Education Board for some two decades; writing volumes of pedagogical works dealing with basic questions, and with philosophy, ethics, and cultural history; and

initiating a new literature in the field of education.

The distinguished Hungarian philosopher, Bernát Alexander, a contemporary of Mór Kármán, wrote of him that, "He was the most well read, the most learned and best organized Hungarian intellect." "All this was for the schools and the schools were for Hungarian culture."

As university professor of education in Budapest, Mór Kármán taught thousands upon thousands of students. In 1913 upon the occasion of his 70th birthday, he was honored with a special tribute and book signed personally by hundreds of his former students as well as colleagues and associates. On his birthday, they greeted him as "Magister Hungariae," who was at home in elementary and secondary education as well as in the university. This document¹ recognized again Mór Kármán's steadfast ethical basis for life, which inspired his devotion to duty and selflessness.

Earlier, in 1897 on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Kármán's teaching career, a 308 page volume was dedicated to him with articles by some sixty of the most distinguished names in Hungarian and European science, philosophy, and education. Among the tributes, there was a poem, which in one of its stanzas reads thus in free translation:

And what is your reward, O kindhearted Master
For giving our school an ideal?
Ever with a strong spirit, but oftentimes with a weak body
You never tired in proclaiming your principles.
It is the happy awareness that you accomplished everything
That Providence assigned to you,
And that your word did not pass into the desert unheard,
Because your enemies also listened.

Mór Kármán was born in Szeged, Hungary, on December 25, 1843 and died in Budapest on October 14, 1915. His influence and role in shaping the modern Hungarian educational system was immense and his influence upon students and teachers alike was phenomenal. It is this extensive contribution to the total Hungarian cultural life that his son, Theodore von Kármán, who in his own right is remembered for an unexcelled range of unique con-

¹The original illuminated manuscripts and sheets of signatures are part of the von Kármán collection maintained by the library of the American Hungarian Studies Foundation.

tributions to aerodynamics, engineering, science and education, wanted us in the English-speaking world to be aware of and to know about the great master pedagogue of Hungary, Mór Kármán.

In these few pages of foreword, one cannot do justice to the magnitude of the contributions by Mór Kármán to the field of education; however, this writing hopefully will serve as an introduction to a worthy subject that others will pursue and write about in detail.²

August J. Molnar

President

American Hungarian Studies Foundation

²For more information in English about Mór Kármán, consult *The Wind and Beyond: Theodore von Kármán, Pioneer in Aviation and Pathfinder in Space* by Theodore von Kármán with Lee Edson (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967). Among Hungarian sources, the writings of Mór Kármán, and in addition to the previously cited tribute written in 1897 and edited by György Volf and János Waldapfel, *Emlékkönyv; Kármán Mór huszonöt éves tanári munkásságának ünnepére*, also see the following: Ödön Weszely, *Kármán Mór Emlékbeszéd* (Budapest, 1917); László Felkai, *Adalékok Kármán Mór oktatástanához* (Budapest, 1957); Szilárd Faludi, "Kármán Mór," *Köznevelés*, 1965:19; László Felkai, "Kármán Mór emlékezete" *Pedagógiai Szemle*, 1965:12.

I.

What I can offer you on this occasion¹ is not so much an objective discourse but rather a personal communication in the nature of a confession. I do not even endeavor to bolster my specific assertions with evidences of theoretical reasoning. Instead, I am merely striving to justify my views through the sincere disclosure of my experiences together with a pertinent arrangement of my data.

At any rate, I am not a learned specialist in history. Very early, while still a student, my thoughts were fascinated by the intricacies of questions relating to education and all my studies were primarily directed towards their solution. Stripped of its pedagogic aspects no scientific investigation fully captured my interest. However, the viewpoint from which I contemplated the problems involved in education suggested to me from the outset the need for discovering the patterns of history. This guiding principle was my deep conviction, and to a certain degree I regard it as the most treasured part of my confession, that is to say, that the human race is engaged in a historical activity. I am not referring to the viewpoint which usually is called, especially in our country, "historical consciousness." A mere respectful appreciation of the past will hardly suffice as a basis for educational tasks which by their very nature must be dedicated to the service of the future. The true basis of historicism lies in the clear grasp of the fact that every human task requires the continuous effort and consistent pursuit of generations. In the whole arena of public life there exists no goal or field of endeavor, which could be attained or fulfilled within the confines of the time limitations of an individual life or of a single generation. Therefore, the bond of historical continuity not only requires us to relate our striving respectfully and diligently to the past of our humanity and our nation. Also it particularly requires of us that we insure the fruition of all our

¹Read by the author at the May 16, 1908 meeting of Normal Grammar School Association in Budapest, Hungary. Published in *Budapesti Szemle*, July issue of the same year.

efforts by preparing and readying the succeeding generation to carry on, having been instilled with the proper reason and lofty emotion. It is this requirement which provides the justification for educational effort and for a commitment thereto. For pedagogy can be a scientific discipline only if it bases itself — like its closest relations in the field of learning, the sciences of politics and economics — on a historical foundation and if it organizes the rules of its practical activities in accordance with the directives of historical development.

The first step towards this goal would appear to be the analysis of ethical ideas in a manner that would permit their structure to serve as standard in the appreciation of the stages of moral development. No matter how historical research, declaiming its objectivity, held that the various ages and men must be evaluated by different standards, that each must be judged from its own point of view: nonetheless, ethics saw its task mainly in pointing up final goals and discovering universally valid maxims. The pedagogue could make little use of such exercises in ethics. The educator's effort is directed toward creating a place and a sphere of power for morality in the developing soul. Herein he can be assisted only by a theory which is capable of highlighting the elements of morality in the emerging phenomena of inner life. Not even common sense doubts that the moralities of a child, a youth or later a mature man or woman differ, i.e., that each stage in life is entitled to its own moral structuring. No man finds his destiny as an immutable goal, determined once and for all. With the development of one's inner awareness the individual learns about his rising aims, just as a people with a rise in its educational levels faces through its historical formation process ever new and previously unknown tasks, which earlier might have been completely unrealistic and perhaps even unsuspected. Thus I found that the problem of formulating morality in the analytic conception of the unique stages of moral life also takes into account the gradations of its development. It must offer guidance not only with regard to final goals, but it should also mark the path leading towards them by illuminating the individual stages of moral progress.

With respect to the end result of this broad statement on the foundations of pedagogy, let me say that shortly after the start of my career as a teacher I found myself engaged in a critical re-examination of the basic principles of all philosophical investigations. I was able to achieve full satisfaction from the point of

view of my practical work only through a comprehensive system of concepts.² Possibly I am not fully immune from self-deception in my feeling that until this very day, after more than thirty years of study, I have never been let down by the principles, which I adopted mainly for the purpose of comprehending moral life and for appreciating the works of historians. Since that time veritable expeditions have set out from every center of learning throughout the world for exploring the paths of moral development. This question has become a natural and fertile field for voluminous and extensive sociological research. It has afforded me deep pleasure to realize that the numerous and illuminating findings reached from diverse starting points have not only left undisturbed even the broad outlines of my views, but that they have rather enriched, at least to my own satisfaction, the guiding values of my quickly formed convictions with respect to their guiding value.

Within the widely dispersed experimentations of sociology a characteristic and common failing deserves notice. No matter how much most investigations have exploited the analogies of historical transformations and natural organisms and no matter how much most research endeavored to apply, at least, the methods of the natural sciences to their discipline, it is quite apparent that there were hardly any attempts made to seriously come to grips with the task of a quantitative, accurate determination of the various periods in the discovery of historical progress. Yet, in a strict sense, we can talk about the laws and patterns of a process only if we can determine not only its general trend but also its duration in terms of time.

As a teacher, and particularly as a teacher dedicated to the analysis of works of literature and to the stimulation of an appreciation for the events of history, I could have been satisfied with the mere application of the theory of gradation in moral principles. It was sufficient for me to experience the substantial assistance which this kind of instruction projects toward the enrichment of the educational value of the subject matter. Accordingly, I was not even thinking of attempting to test the power of my principles by means of in-depth scholarly investigation. At any rate, my day-

²The first sketches of the foundations of pedagogy were published in the columns of *Magyar Tanügy* (1877, pp. 1-9 "The Moral Task"; 1878, pp. 14-24: "The Work of Education"; 1880, pp. 14-27: "The Path of Historical Development, the First Stage of Historical Life." See the Appendix at the end of this paper.

to-day school activities would not have allowed me the necessary time.

Of late having been released from the yoke of academic routine with respect to my lectures at the university, the need for laying the historical foundations of pedagogy have led me to examine in greater detail these short-comings of our scientific attitudes and, if possible, to try pertinent remedies. From the very start I was convinced that with respect to the course and duration of historical progress, viewed from the standpoint of moral development, it is futile to regard the whole of humanity, indeed the whole species, as a single unit and to search for the guiding law underlying its history. Thus, in examining the requirements of teaching of history, I was forced to embark upon a lengthy detour,³ to wit, "the history of the world in its customary presentation fails to reveal any continuity in that not each succeeding generation advances the culture of its predecessors or furthers the development of its social organization." Humanity does not form a totality which could serve as the foundation for such development. In the history of humanity only certain peoples possess independent lives as units, with subsequent generations being tied together through various historical epochs by means of the bonds of a common tongue and of a shared heritage. I have already stated that it is in the interest of teaching to examine the life of certain outstanding peoples, to highlight and digest their development so that our teaching be coherent, consistent and instructive.

This objection is all the more valid for historical investigation, which analyzes the graduated course of development and thus attempts the discovery of the laws of moral progress.⁴ From this viewpoint it is difficult to identify the necessary and sufficient principles and to find that nation's history whose untrammelled display might be taken as an example of progressive morality. Our knowledge of ancient peoples is fragmentary. The lower levels of their development particularly are almost totally unknown. Their lives were either interrupted at a certain stage of their development, which could hardly be taken as completed, or continued in a different cultural milieu amidst new complications. On the other hand, the existence of modern peoples, as everyday experience shows, is so involved in their mutual relationships, with their of-

³*Magyar Tanügy*, 1874, p. 301.

⁴Among the more recent historians it was especially Lamprecht and Breysig who discoursed on this guiding principle.

fensive wars and peaceful rivalry that none of them offers itself as a clear-cut standard for regular gradations of progress.

Amid such doubts I have considered it advisable — hoping for more distinct delineations within this larger picture — to take Western European culture as historical unit, to investigate the gradations of its development and to look for phases in the course of its history to date. Furthermore, following my serious illness I had to catch up with the historical literature which in the meantime had vastly expanded. Fortunately, perhaps not due to chance alone, the best researchers in England as well as in France have joined forces for a comprehensive treatment of the history of modern nations in a manner which surpasses the German example in many aspects. My keen interest could not have hoped for a more desirable factual foundation. Thus, immersing myself in the material available, I have striven to track down the patterns prevalent in the course of our cultural formation and for guidance I have relied on the primary moral principles and on the basic social concepts which were created accordingly. My findings, over and above my expectations, came so quickly and in such a surprising and, at the same time, exciting fashion that, mainly in the interest of my own equilibrium, I was forced to divulge them to the relatively small and confidential circle comprising the members of the Normal Grammar School Association.⁵ I shall reveal my discovery as briefly as feasible and perhaps a bit sketchily, while retaining for myself the right to present a more penetrating justification within the scope of a larger work in consonance with my strength and available time.

II.

In essence, the question that confronts us whether there appears in the development of Western European culture some kind of periodicity that would clearly reveal the patterns of social progress. History is a process of time. Whatever the causal connection among its components may be, it is to be expected that their effects become manifest in proportion to the epochs of this process. However, the precondition for discovering the characteristic fea-

⁵In 1907 I delivered six lectures on this topic and covered the older and better known attempts at the philosophy of history.

tures and the diachronic formations of changes in the series of historical facts is the sharp differentiation of the graduated individual types of social development. Then, by considering their initial appearances, it becomes possible to analyze the when and why of genuine transformation in the progressive organization of public life throughout time.

The social sciences, although intensely preoccupied with this question, offer in this respect no generally acceptable axiomatic enlightenment.⁶ For a long time I have employed a formulation, arrived at under the guidance of ethical principles, for the clarification of historical data and of literary phenomena and in the course of my extended career this formulation has never let me down — at least not within the scope of the school curriculum.⁷ Perhaps I can find new justification for its validity in that it also offers orientation in this more complex problem.

With regard to the qualities of moral feelings and an ideological frame of reference, three types of social organization may be distinguished, which in the course of the historical development of a people can appear only gradually and consecutively. These are fundamental in the sense that, in every sphere of communal life, i.e., in economical as well as cultural endeavors, they are paralleled by definite and complimentary modifications. Usually, I refer to these three types as societies based on *kinship* or *tribal*, *caste* or *order* and *nation* structures.

The first is based on the bonds of blood. The members of this type of community are tied together at this level by the belief in a commonly shared ancestry. The identity of thought patterns and the uniformity of life styles keep moral feelings between the simple, yet powerful, oscillations of love and hate, gratitude and revenge. A people tends to be grouped into extended families or

⁶In *Année Sociologique* III, issue of 1900, Steinmetz in a paper entitled "Classification des types sociaux," treats the results of earlier attempts. Classifying them into seven categories, he discusses twenty such attempts at establishing such stages in the course of social development. He then makes an attempt at supplying the missing elements. His work was not successful either. His otherwise worthwhile paper reveals again the fatal error of all sociological studies, namely, that mostly they are conducted without any deeper ethical insight or psychological learning.

⁷See "Adalékok a gymnasiumi oktatás elméletéhez" (Contributions to the Theory of Teaching at Gymnasiums), Budapest 1898, in the 1882/83 and 1894/5 *Theoreticum*, publication of proceedings on the teaching of Hungarian literature (mainly p. 52) and, in part, history (mainly p. 105).

tribes whenever it spreads over a given region, within a definite and circumscribed area. Social contact is regulated by tradition, which is believed to be ancient. Difficulties of communal life are resolved by the tribal chieftain. Only for more ambitious enterprises do the extended families or tribes unite under one of the more eminent tribal chiefs. The consecutive generations are tied together by the memory of ancestors extending beyond life to the sphere of eternal deities, of whom the chiefs sometimes are supposed to be the descendants.

People who are divided by the variations of communal needs or by the differences of communal tasks form a community typical of the second stage of social development. Such form is unlikely to be the result of calm and peaceful historical contacts. Rather it is usually based on the capture and settlement of a new area, triggered by an overall migration of peoples. Competing classes originate as the result of opposing interests and of divergent types of communal soul and communal thought characteristics. The evolution of their struggle and submission gains expression through clear regulation: it is thus that tradition and custom are replaced by the rule of the law. The moral conduct of each class is prescribed by its specific conditions of existence and the value of its activities determines its position within the community. In other words, classes become castes. Just as in a class, the rank of offices is decisive with regard to the thinking and life style of each of its members; so among the entire community of a people, the graded position of the castes forms the focal point of the struggle fought with unceasing determination as long as some kind of hierarchy is established, as such gradation is named for the exemplary first estate. With respect to this second grade of social organization, a remarkable feature of it is that in the course of contacts with different people, caste membership is more significant than the community of a shared land of birth or the country lived in. The clergy, the nobleman, the commoner, to mention but the major estates, view the foreign clergy, nobleman or commoner more as their own ilk than each views the children of the same country, i.e., members of a different estate from their own country. Alliances to defend shared communal interests spring forth more easily among the corresponding orders of different states than among the classes of the very same state. It is as if the idea of nationality were unknown or at least eclipsed beside the duty of solidarity to the order. At this stage, the entire order of life on earth is patterned after all on the religious conviction

of a hierarchical grouping in heaven, assuming higher and lower deities and saints in the spirit of a revealed law.

While the tribal community is attached chiefly to the *past* and is based on the memory of ancestors, and while the currents in a society based on orders is governed by the interests of the *present*, it may be said that it is mainly the hope for a *future* to be created, which binds together the members of a national body in the third stage, although, or perhaps because, their community is founded mostly on the ties of shared historical consciousness. Among us Hungarians it is hardly necessary to analyze this definition any further. At the time of a barren present, the great herald of our nation, the greatest Hungarian, focused the nation's attention not towards ancient glory lurking in the dim night of the past, but rather he urged the nation to develop its inner characteristics, the treasures hidden in its bosom.

At least, in the field of literature his call did not remain unheeded. To verify the artistic genius of our people, we have a right to call upon not only the Horaces and Vergils of Hungary but Petöfi and especially Arany, who have entered into the treasury of world literature the characteristic manifestations of the soul of the Hungarian people. It would appear that, elsewhere too, literature has been the most effective agent in initiating the development of a nation-type society. Even in ancient times, among the flourishing Greek cultures, national consciousness came into being on the foundation of a shared literary language, which overcame local dialects; and it was one of the first spokesmen of that consciousness, who stated so eloquently that it was not birth or origin that qualified one for membership in the Hellenistic world, but the community of culture. Indeed, the demand for public education is contemporary with the awakening of national consciousness. It is then that the cause of public education clearly emerges among the common tasks. For until then, like his rights, the individual's education is not only narrower but also, as a function of one's class, it is divergent both in form and content. Only afterwards, in connection with the demand for equality and as a function of its true and correct sense, will the right to individuality be validated. It will be neither inherited nobility or servitude nor tenure of an office in or faithfulness to an order, which determines the role of each person in public life, but only the value of his suitability and the merit of his personality. And finally, the community of religious beliefs will derive its certitude neither from the protection of ancestral gods, nor will it rely on the heavenly power of a legalized

alliance for defense; instead, the ardor of the soul will strive for the fountain of perfect goodness and holy wisdom, toward the only eternal living God whose church offers ample room for every pure soul and true heart. Freedom of conscience is not satisfied with the mere grace of forgiving tolerance, but it gives expression to the sincere conviction of all with an appreciative respect for the harmony of moral goals.

This sketchy description of the three basic social types offers sufficient guidance concerning the methods for solving our task. However, so as to avoid misunderstandings, may I make a few additional remarks concerning the correct application of such guidance. The characteristics of these three stages appear to exhibit a definite similarity to the three aspects of public morality (*Sittlichkeit*), in which Hegel sees the manifestation of the objective spirit. The trinity which he establishes consists of the family, the civil community (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*) and the state. This undeniable analogy should not mislead anybody's notion that the three aspects of Hegelian trinity are far from being objective developmental stages like tribe, order and nationhood. The latter are co-existent in every larger human community. Each man is a simultaneous participant in a family, a member of a group, as well as a citizen of a nation and, accordingly, he is both a legal personage and the subject of obligations in all his relations at the same time. However, tribal life organization precedes timewise the formation of orders, just as society based on stratification by orders precedes nationhood. Each represents a higher formation, replaces the earlier at the right time and is differentiated by assuming an opposite novel form. Thus, in each of these three formations, the Hegelian trinity can be discovered in keeping with its moral character; the phenomena of family, group membership and statehood representing different entities at different stages of social development in tribal, caste-like and national structures.⁸

Thus, in the history of every developed culture, the three stages just outlined distinguish three separate epochs. It is self-evident that due to a variety of causes, development may be blocked or distorted; and as a consequence of varied circumstances, divergence and variability are just as prevalent as in the evolution of organic life or in the realm of plants and animals. Moreover, it is just as evident that, as the first significant formation came into being

⁸Concerning the stages of development in families, see my lecture on "Feminism and Pedagogy," Budapest 1906, pp. 10-12.

through evolution in time from a more primitive condition, so the transition to a higher level cannot take place instantaneously, at the blinking of an eye, so to speak.

Thus, even in the first stage of development we must differentiate between two separate epochs: the first is the slow emergence from a sort of unstructured animal state, while the second is the full manifestation of the tribal concept in the full totality of public life and in all branches of culture. In subsequent stages, similarly distinct epochs can also be distinguished: the preparation for higher concepts and the formation from lower ones, this process usually being accompanied by struggles, to be followed by the full blooming of this stage. Thus, we can enumerate altogether six different stages in the total progress of the objectified development of every cultural entity.

Perhaps it might not be without interest to mention, without relying herein upon supporting evidence, that two of the most recent attempts at philosophies of history, which chiefly preoccupied the German scholarly community but attracted attention elsewhere, too, in the final analysis also distinguished six epochs. Kurt Breysig, a professor at the University of Berlin (*Der Stufenbau und die Gesetze der Weltgeschichte*, Berlin: 1905), in viewing world history and comparing the evolution of the most diverse peoples without exclusion of even some that are less familiar to us, divides their course of development into prehistoric and ancient times, next into early and late middle periods and, finally, into a new and modern period. Karl Lamprecht, the noted and ingenious professor at the University of Leipzig (*Moderne Geschichtswissenschaft*, Freiburg: 1905), believed to have discovered those six epochs primarily in the history of German people, i.e., in the history of his own nation. But insofar as these periods are delineated on the basis of psychological patterns, he holds that they can be detected in the history of every nation with a developed culture. He classifies the six epochs into three stages on the basis of animism and symbolism, typism and conventionalism, individualism and subjectivism; not a very unified point of view.

My definitions based on the concepts of morality gain a certain measure of confirmation by the fact that by and large they are in agreement with the almost generally accepted typology of the historical evolution of national economies. Customarily, three stages are defined in the sphere of economic life regarding both the organization of production and the means of exchange. In accordance with the first point of view (this is an exposition by

Bücher), it is closed farming which necessarily develops first, i.e., a form of purely private production in which the goods produced are also consumed by their very producers. There is a division of labor and a certain measure of exchange of goods even at this stage, but both are generated in response to circumstances that are rooted in nature; the first in keeping with the differences in the same family between man and woman, master and servant; while the second is due to the variable local conditions such as soil and weather differences. A second, higher level is represented by the formation of local economies. Here the division of labor is greater, but there is usually a direct contact between producer and consumer. The needs of the city for raw materials and foodstuffs are usually satisfied by the neighboring areas, which in turn are users of the products of the city's industries. Trading is also performed as a small-scale enterprise which is restricted to the local area, so that even the most enterprising wholesale merchant works as a house-to-house or market salesman. Statewide or national economy represents the third stage. Based on a finer and finer division of labor, it supports a more and more general exchange economy. Almost all products travel through a series of economic units prior to becoming objects of consumption. Commerce, as the mediator in this scheme, becomes a real organizational power. The same graduality is noted by the second point of view (Hildebrandt's presentation), when it differentiates between the pure economy of goods, next the economy based on money and finally the economy based on credit. When these views are unified and the intervening transitions and social aspects are taken into account, we again encounter the six epochs (especially according to Schmoller). In the first epoch, man lives grouped in herds and according to blood relationships, in the absence of almost any close local ties. Such a community dissolves easily; but if strong military formations are established with a firmer tribal awareness, public life becomes more stable and a state is created. Here, i.e., the second epoch, agricultural independent economies and all characteristics of tribal organization take shape. During the third and fourth epochs,⁹ the ter-

⁹See: Conrad, *Grundriss zum Studium der polit. Oekonomie*. Jena, 1905. Chapter IV: Die Arten der Volkswirtschaft; Gide, *Principles d'Economie Industrielle*, Paris 1905, Book 1, Part 2, Chapter I. Les étapes de l'évolution industrielle; — Chapter 3. Historique du travail, — Book 2, Chapter 1. Historique de l'échange; Schmoller, *Grundriss der Allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre*. Leipzig, 1901-1904. Book IV, 4. Die wirtschaftliche und allgemeine Entwicklung, etc.

ritorially based state organization is gradually created on the foundation of city economies in conjunction with a division of social life into orders and classes. With the awakening of national consciousness and statehood every people traverses, in line with its own independent culture, from national economy to world trade and international contacts.

III.

With this outlook and amidst such conditions did I make the attempt to demarcate the boundaries in the development of Western European cultural history. With appropriate diligence I strove to look, not in hidden yet to be discovered events, for the appearance of characteristic features of each period. Even in the field of the natural sciences, where many unknown factors were inadvertently discovered and yet remain to be discovered in the future, the more careful spirits always ponder how some new aspect of experience is reconciled with what is known already and incorporate it among the certain facts of human knowledge — but only to the extent and only when it is in full agreement with the totality of our knowledge. If it is to strive for an understanding of the unchanging ingredients of the past, history must regard as significant only those facts which even in their own time were regarded as a matter of deep concern and subsequently were recalled, even though in a modified form, as living memory and effective force. It seems to me to be a veritable falsification of history, whenever a later epoch, striving to satisfy its own needs and to promote its own endeavors, emphasizes those aspects in the formation of the past whose importance was not even surmised by that generation, which experienced them and could not even be grasped by it with conscious awareness. Therefore, in my own enterprise, I have aimed at taking into account only those facts in history, which assumed places of significance both among the contemporaries as well as succeeding generations and which always were regarded by historians as significant, although they may not have been perceived as characteristic from the point of view of understanding the course of the entire development.

Our first question is to decide where to place the end of the history of antiquity and where the development of modern times starts in a most definite, separate form. In the school curriculum,

since the last century and definitely through German eyes, the fall of the Western Roman Empire (476 A.D.) is taken as the end of the ancient world. And in this connection, the rise to power of the German tribal chief, Odoacer, as successor to the Roman inheritance is regarded as the beginning of modern times. However, a more careful analysis of these events shows that they barely produced a significant impact at that time. The participating personalities per se do not appear as having exercised a guiding influence upon the consciousness of future generations. In fact, this transformation seems to have been decided by rivalry among the servants of the great Hun ruler, Attila; the father of both the last Roman Emperor and of the first German ruler were notables under Attila, one serving as a court notary and the other as a bodyguard.¹⁰ Together they were dispatched as ambassadors to the Byzantine court, as we learn from the narration by Priscos, where they dared to conspire together with the Germans against the life of the Hun ruler. I believe that this circumstance and also the common knowledge of European people expressed in their legends, attests to the fact that it was precisely the great figure and influence of Attila which demarcates the boundary between the ancient and modern worlds, whether we take his battle at the Catalaunian plains (451) or the even more significant withdrawal of the great ruler from the siege of Rome (452), and regard, as evidence for the definite transition, the public awareness expressed through the legends associated with these two events in order to arrive at a specific date. "The legend concerning the encounter between the Hun ruler and the Pope is an instructive fact. Whatever remained from the old world now seeks the protection of the Pope, and the barbarian bends his knees before him and before the ancient world through him. It is veritably a symbolic event! Christian Rome, heir to the ancient world, stops the Hun ruler in his tracks." (Schubert, *Kirchengeschichte*, 1906).

In reality, Leo the Great is not so much the representative of the dying past as he is of the future just getting under way. He is clearly aware and enthusiastically representative of the modern historical role of the Holy See. It is in this sense that he proclaimed to the people of Rome: *It is through the Holy See of Peter the Apostle, that you are at the head of the world and your power will be extended further through divine faith rather than through worldly*

¹⁰The historical sense of Arany is revealed in a whimsical scene where the two youngsters seemingly act out their subsequent historical roles. (*Csaba királyfi*, First version, Song II, verses 10-16).

rule.¹¹ On the other hand, we can see in Attila the prime representative of power based on tribal organization. Partly due to fear, partly in the hope of bounty, he becomes the rallying point for almost all the tribes, which were organized at this initial stage in human history. His luminous and successful personality guides the ventures of various tribal chieftains for a considerable period of time during the so-called age of migration. Besides, the shifts among the leading peoples of the developing new culture are also closely connected with the appearance of the great Hun ruler. The Saxon settlement in Britain is dated around 449 A.D. The Roman governor does not return to Gaul after the retreat of the Huns, so that even the provinces are absorbed step by step into the realms of German and mainly Frankish tribal chiefs.

Accordingly, it is around the middle of the fifth century — to state a round figure, say about 450 A.D., that the modern history of the new peoples of Western Europe gets under way, and it is from that time on that we can consider our cultural development as continuous and uninterrupted. It starts off from the level of communal morality, which we earlier characterized as the first phase in the development of a people and as the second stage of established tribal organization. Concerning the first stage, as it were the prehistoric state, we know about it only from the Roman writers (mainly from the *Germania* of Tacitus). Now, on the basis of the tribal structure already developed everywhere, enthused and structured by the example of the great Hun ruler, attempts are being made all over the lands freed from Roman rule to establish larger social and governmental units. Slowly, the Roman Church assumes the leading task of education and organization and, in keeping with the degree of its own liberation from the official domination by the Emperor and with the establishment of its own hierarchical organization of orders, it becomes the prime factor in the progressive transformation of the peoples under its spiritual sphere of influence.

It took fully three hundred years for the new order of these peoples to become fully established. That is, people and country nowhere form a true unity until about 750 A.D. (according to Breysig), so long as they are regarded, in keeping with tribal concept, as the property of some ruling tribe chieftain, and thus the fate of

¹¹From the address of Leo on Peter and Paul Day: *Isti (Petrus et Paulus) sunt qui te ad hanc gloriam prorexerunt, ut gens sancta, populus electus, civitas sacerdotalis et regia, per sacram B. Petri sedem caput orbis effecta latius possideres religione divina, quam dominatione terrena.*

the people is decisively affected by occasional bloody rivalry among the members of the ruling family. Such excesses of the tribal mode of life threaten most communities with almost complete dissolution and the need to avoid such threats and even more so the need for defense against external attacks impose the necessity for closer association and brings welcome changes. The forward pressure of Islam affected Western countries, especially during this period, in such a manner. It was on the basis of successful defense against this danger that Carolingian rule was founded and is considered the first successful manifestation of the new concept of life. The role played by the papacy in this transformation is well known. Pepin is undoubtedly the apostle of the Germans, and it is under his influence that Boniface petitions the higher, somewhat mystic, authority of the Holy See in the matter of acquiring for himself the throne, which had been prepared for him by the noble feats of his ancestors, and he could not obtain it easily without offending dominant public opinion. He sends emissaries to the Pope to inquire whether the Merovingians should remain kings, although they have neither the necessary power nor ability. The answer he received was this: it is preferable that he who has the power should rule as King. Thus he acquires the throne, primarily due to the influential voice of the apostolic seat, but also because of the "choice of the Frank nation and the homage of the great." And so Boniface anoints him king (751 A.D.).

I do not think I am in error if, in consonance with the belief of the era and the evidence of the facts, I designate this event as the boundary, the beginning of the new age, which, first in the Frankish empire and later under its influence throughout the entire Western European community, initiated the spread of the feudal concept among all layers of society in substitution for the tribal concept of life and tribal organization.

The profound transformations of morality, which accompanied this change in kings, is attested to most emphatically by the fact that already under Pepin's rule a consciously and deliberately formulated body of laws is first introduced alongside the old-style common laws and then used to replace the latter. I refer to the capitulary decrees which differ essentially and by their very nature from everything the barbarians had used until then as written law and which endured even for a brief period afterwards (*leges barbarorum*). These differ from tribe to tribe and from people to people. They were intended not for the entire country and regulated relations between individuals in accordance with their ancestry.

In contrast, the capitularies regulate the administration and the government of the country and, upholding the common good, are binding for the entire population irrespective of tribal affiliation.¹² They represent the first manifestation of that moral principle which, concurrent with the spread of feudalism, begins to encompass everything, placing the thoughts of the individual and his total conduct under constant control. Its final development is that mode of life which prescribes in minute detail for the individual, on the basis of his social status rather than his origin, the rules of his conduct in every aspect of life, and which regards obedience to the social conventions as the greatest testimony to morality, replacing the use of individual judgement.

New ideas and trends mature slowly. Moreover, they cannot triumph without struggle, since the remnants of old customs and ancient beliefs exert a confusing influence on the acceptance of the new life and, in most cases, can be overcome only by brute force. Furthermore, the feudal principle creates through the division of the population conflicting interests, and promotes constant rivalry and, moreover, its full development also requires the complete freedom and independence of every estate. Thus it could be said that during the Middle Ages that peace was an exceptional state of affairs, there being no law applicable to all since the rights and law courts of each class and estate differed. This centennial turbulence can in turn be subdivided into two clearly separated eras by the observation that in the beginning the feudal concept carries on its struggles with spirited tribal feeling, and only later does the independent organization of the feudal, mainly the religious and secular, powers become central to the conflict. First the sovereignty of kings and emperors is enhanced by the authority of the Church; then the Emperor saves the papacy from the imposed tutelage of the noble Roman families, until at last, the strengthened secular and church powers face each other as antagonists. Thus rises the powerful figure of Hildebrand, whom Leo IX takes from Cluny in 1050 as his councilor and who later on directs the Church with great insight and firm hand under four subsequent popes, placing in 1059 the independent election of the pope in the hands of cardinals, until finally after a quarter of a century, he reaches the Holy See himself. His superb intellect, like that of Leo I six centuries earlier, is in full harmony with the sacred vocation of the Holy See and imprints a decisive cast

¹²Nos considerantes utilitatem nostram et populi a Deo nobis concessi — this is the justification of many capitularies.

upon it for succeeding centuries. He holds that the office of the pope must become an independent guardian of the fate of humanity, free from all secular influences; that the church organization and its officials must set an example for other classes and professions. I dwell on his directing and disciplinary activity only briefly, although it extended to every member of the European community of peoples. It was decisive for developments in England, and had worldwide significance as regards the establishment of the feudal concept, that William the Conqueror captured the English throne under his patronage. Finally, he determined the fate of centuries to come, when he inspired the rulers for a common venture: the crusades for the liberation of the Holy Land and sepulcher.

If one desires to gain a balanced view of the moral forces, one cannot ignore, at about this time, the circumstance and the beginning of a spiritual movement that led to the organization of "studium" beside "regnum" and "sacerdotium." (Lanfranc founds his school in the Abbey of Bec in 1045 and it is here that St. Anselm, the school's first great scholar, studies.) Learning and knowledge are elevated as the great new representatives of unity and authority. Just as the institution of knighthood bound together every man in arms in Europe and united them for common enterprises, thus did the university of doctors, magisters and scholars tie together the most distinguished minds of the most diverse nations. This was one of the most noble by-products of the feudal concept and in many respects it can be regarded as the basis for the development of the third great epoch in the development of Western Europe.

The dawn of the third main period of our modern age and culture is usually referred as the "renaissance," i.e., rebirth, revival. Although the name stands primarily for the reassertion of the traditions of antiquity, we must not forget, that at every phase in our development, our acquaintance with the traditions and needs of antiquity offered great assistance. In effect, this modern movement is the third renaissance in this sense. It was preceded by movements in the eighth and ninth centuries, which again marked a turning point in our development, and every one of them was more profound and elevated than the preceding one.¹³

There is no doubt as to the beginning of this last most decisive period, if we apply the moral standard that it is contemporaneous with the awakening of national feeling and parallel to

¹³Compayré, *Histoire critique des Doctrines de l'Éducation* (1879) I, p. 46 and 47; West, *Alcuin and the Rise of the Christian Schools* (1892), p. 2.

the awareness of statehood based on nationality, as contrasted to the spirit of feudal affiliation. The awakening of ancient Roman tradition coincides with the departure of the pope from Rome to France and to the banks of the river Rhone in a state of feudal dependence under French sovereignty. This was later referred to as the Babylonian captivity. It is then that Rienzi's call awakens the republican spirit, the memories of the ancient self-rule and government of the cities. "The oratory with which the Roman tribune brings the love for the fatherland to life is sheer archeology. At the gate of the Capitoline Church, close to the Tarpeian Rock and the lair of the she-wolf, Rome proclaims its imperial right over other nations and calls upon the peoples of Italy to restore Italian unity, the ancient power and glory of the City. Patriotism, national independence, freedom for the people, all are demands based on the study of antiquity and oratorical explanations of fragments of the *Lex Regia*."¹⁴ "Although his political enterprise was frustrated, the words of Rienzi exerted a greater effect on the soul of the people than any governmental bargaining. His ideas were accepted by the greatest writer of his age and they were further elaborated by him more eloquently than anything humanity had heard in the course of the last thousand years. Petrarch termed the appearance of the patriotic tribune as the dawn of a new world, a golden age."

On the other hand, the incumbent King Charles IV signals the new age of education with its entire outlook by his every decree. "The origin of German renaissance dates from 1350 when Cola di Rienzi appears in the court of Charles IV. It is well-known that the great masters of Italian literature, Petrarch and Boccaccio, were also in personal contact with the King."¹⁵ It also takes three hundred years, after the modification of papal elections which established and secured papal independence, for the rule of the empire to be transformed into national sovereignty as expressed in the Golden Bull of Charles (1356).

The great blessing of civilization that was generated by the influx into the life, art and science of the modern peoples from the revival of classic works cannot be analysed in detail on this occasion. Our objective is to note the changes in public life and from this point of view the most decisive fact is the new definition of the notion of statehood besides the birth of national literatures

¹⁴Baron Acton, *Lectures on Modern History* (1906) p. 71.

¹⁵Arnold, *Die Culture der Renaissance* (1905), p. 121.

and connected with them the rise and spread of public education. "The only branch of literature in which works comparable to those of the antiquity were created during the Renaissance is politics" (Acton). Thus the sovereignty of the modern state, that does not tolerate any division in power, became the foundation for theory and the active force in practice, which united these split societies, rift apart by the antagonistic interests of classes and estates, and forged them into nations.

The notion of motherland and the emotion of patriotism are the products of that age. Whoever correctly weighs the relative strengths of the significant powers and factors cannot doubt that even the movements, related to the Reformation and to the rift within the Church, were far more influenced by the emotions of patriotism than by the ideas that pertain to dogmas and rites. In essence, the Reformation was nothing but an act of remembering that our culture is founded not solely on the Greco-Roman world, that there was also a Christian antiquity and not only a pagan one with which we also have to concern ourselves. This teaching was addressed to all denominations. Moreover, among the popes of the Renaissance, it was precisely the first, Nicholas V, who was deeply imbued with the belief that theology would be renewed only on the basis of credible and penetrating knowledge of the true historical sources of religion. Besides, the fact that life necessarily leads to new social formations and separate national churches rather than in the direction of a unifying study, offers serious evidence for the validity of the starting point of our analysis, which postulates that the leading idea of the age was: the formation of national units. When humanity, tired of the religious warfares, found the means of a peaceful settlement in the application of the principle, "*cuius regio eius religio*," one discovers clearly a common direction in the intricate pathways of history.

For this reason the reformation of the Church, neither the Catholic which began much earlier nor the Protestant which came later, are decisive in the course of European development. Both represent simply peculiar shifts towards the unfolding of national life. For in the general political turmoil, where powers professing different religious faiths make or break alliances in accordance with the interests of the state and regardless of the religious convictions of their peoples, we witness the creation of the moral attitude that is still the guiding principle during the turmoils of even our own age.

This new period, the summit of our development, is fully established when the principle of the sovereignty of the state is formulated as the sovereignty of the will of the people, when liberty appears as freedom of thought and conscience, and in connection with these the freedom of the press, and when equality demands recognition, not as a fact of nature, but as a corollary to human dignity.

During the vicissitudes of the Puritan rebellion in England, the party of Independents becomes prominent. It derives its strength not from its theological tenets, but from a new formulation concerning the government of the church. Local self-government was its professed belief and the spirit of democracy its essence. The sovereignty of the people, first having demanded a place in the constitution of the church, could not deny itself in relation to questions of public life. The people desired not merely liberty but equality. The authority of the past was completely rejected and the memory of the dead could not be allowed to control the life of the living. At the root of the new belief was the conviction that the persecution of every true belief amounted to the murder of the soul. Every denomination is entitled to equal freedom, Catholics, Jews and Turks included. They, the Independents, it was asserted, did not fight for their religion but for the freedom of souls, for the inborn human right of conscience. They did not start the Civil War in England, but with elevated souls they ended it. "The English republic — which was thus founded — the Commonwealth, is a turning point in the development of the whole world. Its chief merit lies in the greatness and especially in the richness of its ideals trumpeted aloud for the whole world to hear. It provided with principles not only the second, more peaceful revolution in England, but it became the breeding ground even for the American and French revolutions. The development of the world continues in the same direction ever since. It was along this path that the Anglo-Saxon race became the leader of the world." (Acton).

The great nonconformist, Cromwell, is the arm of this age while Milton, the great Puritan poet, is its mind. The middle of the seventeenth century (1650) is the beginning of our most modern period.¹⁶ It was on January 15, 1649, that the "Agreement of the People" was issued by the army which conquered the royal forces.

¹⁶Also compare the work of Kidd: *Principles of Western Civilisation* (1902), Chapter IV.: "The Phenomenon of Western Liberalism."

One can discover in it the source of all the principles which the progressive movements of the world have regarded as their own ever since. It contains the tenet of the people's sovereignty, the idea of the highest power that is entrusted for the duration of a defined period to the representatives of the people, the idea of equal right of every taxpayer to participate in elections. Equally, it embodies the idea of religious freedom and of the complete separation of church and state, even the demand that the body of representatives be limited in their right to legislate by means of certain fundamental laws, an idea which subsequent American and European constitutional proposals faithfully copied.

It is afterwards in 1651 that Milton publishes his noble defense document against the execution of the King: *Defensio pro populo Anglicano*. One would believe that he held that the people exist for the King rather than the other way round; that all the subjects together amount to less than he alone, a kind of sellout of the cause of "human dignity."¹⁷ Perhaps this is the first application of this principle as regards the state. Beyond this Milton is the first great prophet of individualism in the sense in which it has since that time become the idol of that age. Even earlier (1644) Milton took to the field for these ideas with his brilliant *Areopagitica*, containing the demand for the freedom of thought and press. With eloquence and forceful indignation he condemns every variety of censorship by reasoning that if the human spirit is more than mere self-delusion and deception, if it is given a free reign, it must be victorious over mistaken beliefs. In the name of rational spirit he protests against every kind of conformity in conduct, thought and expression; this being not only beyond reach but also undesirable. The great haven, that is deep enough to accommodate both individual well-being and national progress, must be constructed upon soberly limited diversity. The same years also saw the publication, in the cause of the defense of the English people, of the work of Hobbes: *Leviathan; or the Matter, Form and Power of Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil*. This work, on the other hand, defines the principle of state sovereignty by means of scientific and mathematical precision and asserts that besides his acts, the conscience and religious faith of man, must also be subjected to it. He regards it as rebellious to say that "acting against one's conscience is sinful" or that "sovereign power is also subject to the

¹⁷Tyrannum sane tollere quam constituere divinius est; plusque Dei cernitur in populo quoties iniustum abdicat regem, quam in rege qui innocentem opprimit populum. *Defensio* (Fletcher, ed.) p. 661.

law of the land." It behooved thinkers of later times to sort out these contradictory principles and it fell upon statesmen following this period to create institutional guarantees for the just manifestations of human dignity. It is in the realization of this task that the moral substance of our modern age is found.

IV.

May I briefly summarize the results of our investigations. We observed that Western culture passed through all the developmental stages of socio-ethical categories. Disregarding the preparatory phase of the first stage, which preceded conscious history, the boundaries of five distinct phases could be identified. The first is dominated by *tribal* concepts (450-750), the third by feudal concepts (1050-1350) and the fifth (1650 to the present) by *national* concepts, and these phases are paralleled by the development of corresponding body politics. The second (750-1050) and fourth (1350-1650) are transitional phases, i.e., from tribal to feudal, on the one hand, and from feudal to national, on the other hand. It is surprising that irrespective of their quite diverse characters, all these phases are of the same duration. This represents such a remarkable phenomenon in the natural organic world, that it is almost unparalleled even in an examination of the evolutionary phases of animal and plant lives, although modern-day science would not question the inevitable necessities of natural laws.

In the selection of events I have taken pains to indicate the graduality of the development in every single instance. I have shown that their significance was recognized at the time by the conduct of their contemporaries and that posterity accepted this judgment with current historical writing concurring. Yet, I cannot dismiss the possibility that minds inclined to doubt will see a mere playful and witty compilation devised simply for the sake of bringing about proportionality in the various periods of this presentation. Therefore, while still avoiding a detailed exposition, I should like to single out two such circumstances, which indicate that even the substance of evolution reveals a proportionality which parallels the proportionality apparent in the duration of a given period.

First, in each of the ages in which the new concept of life is already a more powerful factor, the summit of development occurs

strictly at the middle of the period, i.e., about 150 years from its beginnings. There appears to prevail a veritably geometric proportionality between the major representatives of the times of tribal concept: Popes Leo the Great (450) and Gregory the Great (600); of the feudal concept: Hildebrand (Gregory VII, 1050) and Pope Innocent III (1200); and of the age of the nation-states: Cromwell, who rose to power in the *Puritan* rebellion (1650), and the child of the *French* revolution, Napoleon (1800). But even during the periods of transition, though not with the same clarity because of the transitory nature of these periods, one detects the more mature and noble manifestations of the initial strivings right at the very middle of the pertinent period. The strivings for a Frank state (Pepin and even Charlemagne) seem to have been frustrated early, mostly because the traditions of tribal society were still very much alive and one needs only to recall the division of the country among the members of his family after the death of the king. Yet, after merely a century and a half, at the time of the dissolution of the Carolingian rule and under much more difficult conditions, related ambitions in the Anglo-Saxon cultural sphere prove successful, as evidenced by the defense arrangements, individual cultural activities and the legal reforms of Alfred the Great; and they become exemplary for the entire future development of our overall cultural sphere. In the same manner, after unsuccessful starts due to the embroilments of the age, it takes 150 years for the Renaissance to attain full growth in every sphere of culture (1500). The political concepts of Rienzi and Charles of Luxemburg assume a more definite and historically significant form in the theory of Machiavelli and the practices of Maximilian of Habsburg. Around this time, especially during the papacy of Julian II, Rome becomes the real focal point and leader of the Western European world order and spiritual movements. It borders on blasphemy when the King of Portugal (1505), drunk with the great miracles of exploration, addressed the Pope thus: "You, who are our God, receive at last the whole world."

The second no less characteristic feature — and one which perhaps even permits us to surmise the basis of patterns of development — is to be found in the fact that regularly in every period, right after the pervasive feeling of elevation which manifests itself at the middle of the period and which seems to be generated as the victory of reason, at once during the first or second decade a special movement of emotional excitement becomes noticeable, which through the idealization of the past counteracts the prevail-

ing state of affairs, and at the same time serves to prepare the ground for transformations in thought and society. Thus, at the peak of tribal life, the opportunist spirit and politics of the Gregory the Great is confronted by the missionary ventures of the natives of the "Holy Island" (for instance, St. Columban), which involuntarily lay the foundations for the great cloister workshops and schools of the future in distant lands, in various countries, in hermit settlements, which are to serve as the cultural centers for the coming age. Similarly, 300 years later at the time of the turbulent dissolution of the Carolingian rule and in order to remedy the ills of the age, the Abbey of Cluny is begun to promote *reform* which, on the one hand, sets the example for the feudal way of life and, on the other hand, by the personal participation of the abbot-nobles, finds the means of transforming both the empire and the papacy. Let me only mention similar movements of subsequent periods. The *mendicant orders* of the early thirteenth century, which are only reluctantly approved by Innocent III, the humble spirit of St. Dominic and the burning emotionality of St. Francis both prepare the ground for the spiritual movements of the Renaissance, in the same unintentional manner, as the Protestant reformers at the start of the 16th century promoted the upsurge of national feelings. And who knows whether the Romantic movement, which arose at the time of Napoleon and against him, and regarded at the outset as being in close contact with the spirit of nationalism, might not have been the precursor of a higher morality, which may crystallize at the limit of the current period (1950). Who knows but that the often doubted diplomatic conferences in the Hague, the interparliamentary meetings, international congresses and societies might not signal the direction of forthcoming changes: the organization of the entire human race based on the principle of mutually recognized rights?

True scientific insight, however, cannot look for its expression in prognostication. Its duty is to understand facts through the discovery of their constant relations and mutual references. Whether such guidance, given in passing regarding the proportionality of the developmental periods of our history, could promote progressive research? It can only be a matter of faith and hope for me and will be answered by our expert historians with certainty only by their giving heed to it in their research.

It would be necessary to have a more detailed analysis of the moral purposes and initial causes of events and institutions than I

am able to undertake myself. Furthermore, this sketchy outline of the progress of our culture must be replaced by a more detailed and accurate picture through individual examinations of the modes and content of the appearance of major periods within the life of each people. Such analysis should not be limited to the observation of the initiation and termination of a given period, but should be extended to a characterization of the briefer or longer intervening movements therein so as to facilitate not only the formulation of the proportionality of historical periods but also the investigation of to what extent they are based upon biological, psychological and ethical relations.¹⁸

To conclude these preliminary investigations in the form of an example, I have attempted the historical segmentation of the history of our native land from these viewpoints. While I cannot regard such an attempt as justified in every way, it is nevertheless surprising that the duration of the historical periods of our nation, as it develops on the eastern border of Western European culture, but, being in continuous contact with it, appear to be fully parallel to the wider historical periods in that they also extend for three centuries each. The Hungarian people by all available valid evidence had fully developed its tribal organization by the time it settled within its present boundaries, acquired the homeland and entered into the European cultural sphere. Thus the uninterrupted history of its conscious development started as it was in the second phase of its first stage, and it consisted of the transition from tribal to feudal organization. The general state of affairs, at that time throughout Western Europe under whose influence it came, was already more advanced by some 150 years, which amounts to half the duration of the total period. It is significant that this relationship remained in force throughout the course of our history without change: the direction, contents and results of our intellectual and moral endeavors stayed behind the actual level of the leading West-

¹⁸Ottokar Lorenz, *Die Geschichtswissenschaft in Hauptrichtungen und Aufgaben* (1886), Chapter VI: "Über ein natürliches System geschichtlicher Perioden" (pp. 279-299). On biological grounds he considers a century to be a coherent unit, i.e., the time span of three generations; however, for longer periods viewed from the point of historical data and psychological considerations, he recommends the use of periods covering 300 to 600 years, corresponding to three times three and three times six generations.

ern European nations by a century and a half throughout.¹⁹ This has proved, in my opinion, a fatal circumstance regarding our whole existence. Our nation usually reached the beginning of a certain transformation when the European spirit had already reached its summit. When we adapted ourselves and finally reached the peak, the characteristic features of the corresponding age in Europe are already in the process of dissolution and ripe for the next transformation. In this way, due to constant contact which tied our fate to theirs, although because of our geographical location this contact could never be intimate or profound, it has been our fate not to reach any stage in our moral progress in fully undisturbed clarity and in consonance with its inherent value. For this reason our culture is fragmented, always deficient and suffers from growing and organizational pains. The extent to which this teaching of the past, if my diagnosis is not completely erroneous, can serve as a warning and as a lesson for the present is a task, which in all likelihood I shall not dare to think through in the near future. In any case, it lies outside the framework of the current presentation.

Let it suffice to indicate here briefly and that in simplified form, the major events are arranged in historical sequence to show the stages of development in our history up to the present time.²⁰

First three hundred years (900-1200): transformation of tribal style of life to the feudal concept, of a closed local economy to a local area-based economy, from an economy based on direct barter to one based on money.

¹⁹This I do not regard as justification, but aside from its anecdotal interest this coincidence is also remarkable. In verses 46 and 47 of song IX in *Toldi szerelme* (Toldi's Love), Arany has Louis the Great and Rienzi talk about the nature of their goals. Rienzi "talks about the ancient glory of Rome, he wants to become, like Cato, a judge of morals," while Louis the Great says: "Nobody can turn the wheels of time forward very much, but especially not backwards" and continuing he makes the following confession: "Thus I, whose weapon is my faith, turn not to the image of Cato, but rather towards the Cid." As is known, Rienzi was a man of the Renaissance and Louis the Great was one of our most distinguished spokesmen in favor of a society based on feudalism. Now there had elapsed precisely a century and a half between him and Cid, the ideal of knightly life. The historical Cid became the hero of legends only about one hundred years after his death in 1099.

²⁰The two numbers suggest the beginning and the peak of each period. For a more accurate representation of events I have also taken into account every fifty-year period.

895-905 (Blood Alliance), settlement in present land. 955 — Battle of Augsburg. 1001 — Coronation of St. Stephen. 1045-1055. Peter became a vassal of the Roman Emperor, but Endre I recovered the country's independence after liquidating the last pagan rebellion. 1095-1105, the laws of Kálmán, capture of the Dalmatian cities. 1151 — Géza II: he saved the independence of the country by defending it against both the East and the West; importation of foreign settlers.

1195-1205 Imre: he promised Innocent III participation in the Crusades; the whip of the king.

Second three hundred years (1200-1500): development of feudalism; the age of area-based economy founded on money. 1245-55 — Béla IV, the building of forts, generating of local power. 1301 — extinction of the house of Árpád — the gentry and the election of the King.

1345-1355 — Louis the Great: march on Naples; confirmation of the Bull of Endre II; determination of ancient rights. 1401 — Struggle between King Zsigmond and his nobles; founding of cities (1405). — 1446-1452 János Hunyadi.

1495-1505 — Ulászló II; 1496 — Parliament: gentry against nobles; 1505 — decision of Parliament: only a Hungarian can be elected King; Stephen Verbőczy.

Third three hundred years (1500-1800): transformation from a feudal order of life to a national state, from area-based economy to national economy, from a money economy to a credit economy. 1551 — Frater György (Martinuzzi) attempted unification of the country. 1604 — Parliament and the uprising of Bocskay.

1645-1655 — Ferdinand III and György Rákóczi I: the treaty of Linz; Ferdinand IV and Leopold I are elected kings during the lifetime of their fathers. 1701 — Rákóczi II in captivity; 1745-1755 — Maria Theresa and the Hungarians.

1795-1805 — Francis II: Martinovics and his associates; election of Joseph to the rank of "Nádor" (Palatine). Assumption of the title of Emperor of Austria; Parliament of 1805: the Hungarian language gained acceptance in public life.

19th Century. The development of our national life continued concurrent with a credit-based national economy. 1848-1852 — Crisis of the Hungarian national state; fight for freedom and subsequent absolute rule. 1896-1906 — the "Millenium" (1000th anniversary of the founding of Hungary). Parliamentary crisis and the independence party gained a majority.