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"Silent Revolution" 2/21/55

The *Washington Post and Times Herald* in its issue of April 18, 1953, commented in an editorial, entitled "Guessing Game," upon the article I wrote for *America* magazine, shortly after Stalin's death, under the title, "Seven Against Malenkov." In this I had voiced the opinion, that an intense and desperate struggle for power is taking place within the new Soviet government, and that notwithstanding his elevation to the premiership, the star of Comrade Malenkov began to sink rather than to rise with the death of Stalin.

Furthermore, I had said, that the new Premier can expect neither support nor quarter from the other ranking associates of the regime—certainly not from Beria; nor from Molotov, who has apparently no power in any case; nor Kaganovich, who would have been an almost certain victim of Malenkov's anti-Semitic policies; nor from Bulganin, a chronic adversary; nor from Vassilevsky, demoted from Minister to Deputy Minister of War; nor from Zhukov, who has more than one personal grudge to nourish; nor from Khrushchev, who has already replaced Malenkov as general secretary of the Communist Party.

I likewise predicted that Malenkov would be unhorsed by the new General Secretary, Nikita Khrushchev, who "is now in a position to work, at least clandestinely, through the party machinery to retaliate for that rebuff on a major issue of Marxist economic ideology." And that, "Malenkov has practically no ascendancy as long as the other seven, in order to protect their own lives, hold together against him," and that "we need no weather bureau to forecast considerable cloudiness over the skies of Moscow."

This was my opinion after Stalin's death. I still hold the opinion today that Malenkov's downfall may bring changes, however, in tactics only; neither in Communist policy or its final objective. It is futile to place hopes in Zhukov or the Red army. Communist policy sticks to its own schedule. Two factors alone may change it: the people, who brought about Malenkov's downfall through their sabotage, and Western policy, if it will not fall for the bluff of the Communist leaders, who are more afraid of their own people than of American guns.

I am convinced that positive resistance against the Communists, with the slogan, "say yes and do no," will continue in full strength. Malenkov's downfall is the first victory of the silent revolution, and this revolution will continue to undermine Communist production, no matter if their jailor is called Bulganin, Khrushchev or Zhukov.

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Editor's Note: The editorial of April 18, 1953, to which Dr. Fabian refers, called attention to his article "Seven Against Malenkov" as an interesting and plausible interpretation of the "intense and desperate struggle for power taking place within the new Soviet government." Dr. Fabian's thesis was that other epigoni, viz, Beria, Molotov, Kaganovich, Vassilevsky, Bulganin, Zhukov and Khrushchev, would combine to bring about Malenkov's downfall and that his only hope lay in somehow contriving to divide them. Dr. Fabian was for 17 years a member of the Hungarian National Parliament.